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Abstract 
 Bureaucracy has long been the most controversial topic in organizational studies. 
Many previous studies provided support to the proposition that public organizations 
are more bureaucratic than private organizations. On the other hand, most of these 
studies have shown that the existence of bureaucracy has a very strong relationship 
with red tape. Therefore, many subsequent studies also supported that public 
organizations have more red tape than private organizations. (Baldwin 1990; 
Bozeman, Reed, and Scott 1991; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994; Bretschneider 
1990; Bretschneider and Bozeman 1995; Rainey 1979 and 1983; Rainey, Pandey, and 
Bozeman 1995). However, not many of these studies have put the focus on project 
organizations in construction industry. Therefore, the researcher would like to conduct 
a comprehensive study on bureaucracy and red tape in the context of construction 
project organizations in Hong Kong. 
 To begin with this study, the understanding of what is bureaucracy and red tape is 
very crucial. Therefore, in this dissertation, the literature of bureaucracy and red tape 
is reviewed. Furthermore, in order to measure and compare the degrees of 
bureaucracy and red tape in the public and private project organizations, questionnaire 
survey and case studies are adopted in this research. From the empirical results, it is 
found that public project organizations really have a higher degree of bureaucracy and 
 
 
ii 
red tape than private project organizations. 
On the other hand, the results of contextual analysis suggest that the perceived 
degree of bureaucracy and red tape can be affected by different years of experience 
and positions in the project organization. This can provide a basis for the future 
research that the measurement of bureaucracy and red tape should consider these two 
variables. The result of correlational analysis suggests that red tape is positively 
correlated with “rules and procedure”, this further supports the proposition that 
“Large amount of rules and procedures in the organization means a higher chance for 
red tape”. 
 The result of this study has revealed an actual situation about the degrees of 
bureaucracy and red tape in the public and private project organizations in Hong 
Kong. The government should carefully have a review on their project organizations, 
so that a balance can be struck between accountability and resources efficiency, any 
excessive bureaucracy and red tape should be cut.  
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Chapter One  Introduction 
1.1 Rationale for the study 
 “Bureaucracy” and “Red Tape” are the mostly cited words for criticizing the 
inefficiency of government organizations. It seems that these two words are always 
linked with the government organizations. Actually, bureaucracy is a form of 
organization which is claimed by Weber (1949) as the most efficient form of 
organization. Its efficiency lines with its characteristics including, the hierarchy of 
authorities, the system of rules and control of the action of individuals in the 
organization. Furthermore, the employment of experts who have their specific areas 
of responsibility and the use of files can ensure an amalgamation of the best 
knowledge and a record of past behaviour of the organization. However, there were 
still many other scholars criticizing this form of organization. They claimed that the 
rigidity and standardization of bureaucracy is not suitable to the modern organization 
which needs flexibility to adapt to the change of environment. They also claimed that 
bureaucracy is inherently pathological. Some scholars view bureaucracy in a more 
neutral approach, they view bureaucracy as an efficient form of organization 
originally. However, if people put too much emphasize on achieving this form of 
organization, dysfunctions and inefficiencies would be resulted. Thompson (1961) 
classified these dysfunctions and inefficiencies generated by bureaucracy as 
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“bureaupathology”. Red tape is one of the bureaupathologies which refers to the 
excessive rules and procedures serving no functional purpose. The existence of red 
tape is regarded as wastage of resources. Same as bureaucracy, the term of red tape is 
also frequently associated with government organizations. 
 A nearly universal assumption of theorists and researchers is that public 
organizations have both higher degrees of bureaucracy and red tape than private 
organizations. Debates regarding dissatisfaction with the government are rarely 
complete without reference to bureaucracy and red tape. However, there were still 
some empirical researches showing that some private organizations are actually more 
bureaucratic and have a higher degree of red tape than government organizations. 
Therefore, the conclusion of “public organizations are more bureaucratic and have 
more red tape than private organizations” still cannot be drawn and generalized.  
 There were many previous studies to compare the degree of bureaucracy and red 
tape in public and private organization. However, there were not many studies 
attempted to compare the degree of bureaucracy in public and private organizations in 
public sector. Therefore, the researcher would like to conduct a comprehensive study 
on the degree of bureaucracy and red tape with the focus placed upon the construction 
project organizations. The researcher would like to investigate whether public project 
organization has a higher degree of bureaucracy and red tape than private project 
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organization. As noted by Bozeman (2000), red tape is one of the bureaupathologies. 
The researcher would also like to find out whether there is a strong linkage between 
bureaucracy and red tape.  
 There are not many studies regarding bureaucracy and red tape focused on 
construction project organizations. In fact, this kind of study is worth to conduct, as a 
construction project requires a commitment of large amount of resources in terms of 
time and finance, if a project organization is not efficient enough, a lot of resources 
would be wasted. However, a certain degree of bureaucracy and red tape is certainly 
necessary for the government to maintain its accountability and delineate a clear 
structure of responsibility. Therefore, the government should maintain balance 
between keeping the efficient use of resources and maintaining its accountability. 
Recently, the problem of government deficit is very serious. In order to achieve the 
balance as soon as possible, our Chief Executive and Financial Secretary have devised 
many strategies to cut government expenditure. One of the strategies is to review the 
existing structure of different government departments. Therefore, it is also necessary 
to review the public organizations in the construction sector, since the government is 
committing a lot of resources in the housing and infrastructure developments in every 
year. If it is true that there are large amount of resources wasted by excessive degree 
of bureaucracy and red tape in public project organizations, the government should 
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take immediate step to review the existing structure and cut the excessive bureaucracy 
and red tape. This research will serve the purpose of determining whether public 
project organization has an excessive degree of bureaucracy and red tape by 
comparing these two phenomenons in public and private project organization 
respectively.  
1.2 Objectives 
 There are generally three broad objectives in this research. Firstly, as there are 
many different approaches to define bureaucracy and red tape, some people view 
them positively, but some people do not, therefore the author would like to review the 
literature of various key concepts about bureaucracy and red tape. Without clear 
understanding of these concepts, these two subjects would become too abstract and it 
is a barrier of further research.  
 Secondly, the researcher would like to compare the degree of bureaucracy and 
red tape between public and private project organizations. Thirdly, the researcher 
would like to investigate the relationship among the bureaucratic features and the 
relationship between bureaucracy and red tape. Finally, the researcher would like to 
investigate whether the factors like, years of experience, types of organization would 
affect the respondents’ perception on bureaucracy and red tape in an organization. The 
researcher believes that this result can provide a basis for the future research on 
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bureaucracy and red tape.  
1.3 Selection of methodology 
 In this research, quantitative approach, instead of the qualitative approach, 
is adopted for this research. Qualitative approach, such as interviews, involves 
detailed investigation of the organizational bureaucracy and red tape is considered as 
not suitable for this research, as it has quite a number of drawbacks. For example, 
statistical comparison is not allowed on common variables. Also, it involves huge 
amount of time and cost in collecting relatively large amount of data. On the other 
hand, quantitative approach enables comparisons among different organizations, 
performance of a large number of statistical tests which enable testing of the data 
empirically. It maximizes the values of precision, systematization, repeatability as 
well as comparability. It can be widely applied in organizational research (Tucker, 
McCoy and Evans, 1991). 
In this study, questionnaires were sent to construction project participants in 
Hong Kong so as to collect data concerning their perception of bureaucracy and red 
tape in public and private project organizations. Questionnaire survey is a kind of 
subjective measurement, which the result can be affected by human variables, 
therefore, in this research, a subjective approach would also be adopted in order to 
cross-validate the result of the questionnaire survey. 
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1.4 Structure of Dissertation 
 This dissertation can be divided into six main chapters. 
Chapter 1 is an overview of this study including the rationale for choosing this topic, 
objectives of the study, methodology selection and the structure of the dissertation. In 
Chapter 2 is literature review. This chapter is divided into three main parts. Part 1 is a 
review about the concept of bureaucracy. Its definition, characteristics and 
inefficiencies are introduced. Part 2 is a review about the concept of red tape, its 
origins, causes and relationship with bureaucracy are discussed. Part 3 introduces the 
previous findings about the different degrees of bureaucracy and red tape in public 
and private project organizations. Chapter 3 is a brief statement about research 
questions and hypotheses of this study. Chapter 4 is a detail explanation of 
methodology of this study. Chapter 5 present and discuss the results of this research. 
The detail of data analysis is also presented. Chapter 6 concludes the major findings 
of this study and identifies the limitations and areas for further research. 
 
 
Chapter Two Literature Review 
7 
Chapter Two  Literature Review 
Part I:  Review of “Bureaucracy” 
2.1 Definition of Bureaucracy 
 According to Bozeman (2000), “Bureaucracy” is originally derived from the 
French word “Bureau”, a desk with many compartments. Encyclopedia Britannica 
(2000) defined bureaucracy as: 
“A professional corps of officials organized in a pyramidal hierarchy and functioning 
under impersonal, uniform rules and procedures. In the social sciences, the term 
usually does not carry the pejorative associations of popular usage.” 
The philosophy of bureaucracy was first formulated in a systematic manner by 
the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), whose definition and theories set the 
foundations for all subsequent work on the subject. According to Mouzelis (1975), in 
order to understand Weber’s ideas about bureaucracy, we have to place them in the 
more general context of his theory of domination. Mouzelis (1975) stated that 
domination refers to a power relationship in which the ruler, the person who imposes 
his will on others, believes that he has a right to the exercise of power, and the ruled 
consider it their duty to obey his orders.   
Weber (1947) distinguished three principles of legitimation – each corresponding 
to a certain type of apparatus – which define three pure types of domination. In the 
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following, the three types of domination will be presented.  
1. Charismatic domination. 
Charisma means literally ‘gift of Grace’, an exceptional quality by virtue of 
which one becomes leader. The charismatic leader justifies his domination by his 
extraordinary capacities and deeds. His disciples accept his domination because 
they have faith in his person.  
2. Traditional domination 
The legitimation of power comes form the relief in the eternal past, in the 
rightness and appropriateness of the traditional way of doing things. the 
traditional leader is the Master who commands by virtue of his inherited status. 
His orders are personal and arbitrary but within the limits fixed by custom. His 
subjects obey out of personal loyalty to him ore out of respect to his traditional 
status. When this type of domination, typical in the patriarchal household, is 
extended over many people and a wide territory, the ensuing administrative 
apparatus can ideally take two forms. 
3. Legal domination 
The belief in the rightness of law is the legitimation sustaining this type of 
domination. In this case, the people obey the laws, because they believe that these 
rules are enacted by a proper procedure, a procedure considered by the ruler and 
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the ruled as correct. Moreover, the ruler is considered as a superior who has come 
to hold a position by legal procedures. It is by virtue of his position that he 
exercises power within the limits set by legally sanctioned rules. 
According to Mouzelis (1975), the typical administrative apparatus corresponding 
to the legal type of domination is called bureaucracy. It is also characterised by this 
belief in the rules and the legal order. The position of the bureaucrat, his relations with 
the ruler, the ruled and his collegues are strictly defined by impersonal rules. These 
rules delineate in a rational way the hierarchy of the apparatus, the rights and duties of 
every position, the methods of recruitment and promotion. The means of 
administration do not belong to the bureaucrat. They are concentrated at the top. Thus 
the position of the official cannot be sold or inherited, it cannot be appropriated and 
integrated in his private patrimony. This strict separation between private and official 
income and fortune is a specific characteristic of bureaucracy, distinguishing it from 
the patrimonial and feudal type of administration. 
 
2.2 Characteristics of bureaucracy 
In this research, the researcher has identified three studies which have 
systematically formulated the characteristics of bureaucracy. The detail is shown as in 
the following: 
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2.2.1 Weber (1947)’s study: 
Weber (1947) is the first author to formulate the characteristics of bureaucracy in 
a systematic manner. According to Weber (1947), the following are said to be the 
fundamental characteristics of bureaucracy:  
(1) A continuous organization of official functions bound by rules. 
(2) A specific sphere of competence. This involves: 
(a) A sphere of obligations to perform functions which have been marked off 
as part of a systematic division of labour. 
(b) The provision of the incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out 
these functions. 
(c) That the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use 
is subject to definite conditions 
(3) The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower 
office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.  
(4) The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical qualifications. 
In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas 
certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected. 
(5) In the rational type, it is a matter of principle that the members of the 
administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means 
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of production or administration. 
(6) In the rational type case, there is also a complete absence of appropriation of his 
official position by the incumbent.  
(7) Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, 
even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory. This applies 
at least to preliminary discussions and proposals, to final decisions, and to all 
sorts of orders and rules. 
Weber (1947) noted that the purest type of exercise of legal authority is that 
which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff. The whole administrative staff 
under the supreme authority then consists of individual officials who are appointed 
and function according to the following criteria. 
(1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their 
impersonal official obligations. 
(2) They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices. 
(3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense. 
(4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is a 
free selection. 
(5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most 
rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying 
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technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected. 
(6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to 
pensions. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; 
but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the 
requirements of the incumbent’s social status may be taken into account. 
(7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the 
incumbent. 
(8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of “promotion” according to seniority or 
to achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgement of superiors. 
(9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of 
administration and without appropriation of his position. 
(10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the 
office. 
Weber (1947) proposed that the main features of bureaucracy lie are the highly 
developed division of labour and specialization of tasks which can be achieved by a 
precise and detailed definition of the duties and responsibilities of each position or 
office. The allocation of a limited number of tasks to each office operates according to 
the principle of fixed jurisdictional areas that are determined by administrative 
regulations. All individuals in the organization are selected on the basis of formal 
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qualifications that ensure that the applicant has the necessary knowledge to 
accomplish that specialized duties effectively. Weber (1949) proposed that once a 
person enters the bureaucratic organization, his office is his sole occupation. It 
constitutes a "career." That is to say, it is not accepted on an honorary or short term 
basis; it implies stability and continuity, a "life's work." Moreover, there is usually an 
elaborate system of promotion based on the principles of both seniority and 
achievement. They usually receive a salary based not so much on his productivity 
performance as on the status of his position. Contrary to some forms of traditional 
administration, the officials of bureaucracy cannot sell his position or pass it on to his 
sons. There is a clear-cut separation between the private and the public sphere of the 
bureaucrat's life. His private property is sharply distinguished from the "means of 
administration" that do not belong to him 
2.2.2 Mouzelis (1975)’s study: 
Mouzelis (1975) summarized the main characteristics of the bureaucracy as 
follow: 
1. High degree of specialization 
2. Hierarchical authority structure with limited areas of command and 
responsibility. 
3. Impersonality of relationships between organizational members. 
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4. Recruitment of officials on the basis of ability and technical knowledge. 
5. Differentiation of private and official income and fortune and so on. 
2.2.3 Bozeman’s (2000) study: 
Bozeman (2000) analysed Weber (1947)’s model of bureaucracy and further 
derived the characteristics of bureaucracy as follow: 
1. Fixed and official jurisdiction, ordered by rules and administrative law 
2. Regular activities distributed in a fixed manner 
3. Authority by directives according to fixed rules 
4. Rights and duties of administrators prescribed by law 
5. Principles of official hierarchy with levels of graded authority; firmly established 
superior-subordinate relations. 
6. Management based on written documents that are preserved in files. 
7. Separation of public private lives of officials 
8. Administration of bureaus that requires expertise, specialized training. 
9. Administration as a full-time job, a career. 
10. Bureau management following specific rules learned and transmitted from one
 official to the next. 
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2.2.4 Summary 
 From the above literature, we can see that bureaucracy is a kind of administrative 
apparatus in this legal domination world. It is characterised by rule and legal order. 
The features of high division of labour and specialization provide the organization 
with efficiency. In order to achieve the division of labour and specialization, 
personnel are selected according to their expertise and ability. The hierarchical nature 
assumed the power to control and command in order to coordinate the specialized 
activities. Weber (1947) claimed that bureaucracy is the most efficient type of 
organization in the modern world. 
. 
2.3 Operationalization of bureaucracy  
Whilst the idea of bureaucracy is conceptualized, its formal operationalization has 
received little attention by researchers. After revised the literature, the researcher has 
only identified one study which has tried to operationalize the concept of bureaucracy. 
The study was done by Bozeman and Rainey (1998); Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman 
(1995) in the National Administrative Studies Project (NASP). They have carried an 
extensive review on the previous literature about bureaucracy and identified the 
following five features of bureaucracy as the instruments for measuring bureaucracy 
in the organizations: 
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1. Hierarchy 
2. Specialization 
3. Approvals needed to perform a task 
4. Written rules and procedures 
5. Record keeping 
Therefore, the above five features would be adopted for to operationalize the 
concept of bureaucracy in this research. 
2.4 Efficiency of bureaucracy: 
Weber (1947) proposed that a bureaucratic organization is technically the most 
efficient form of organization. It is because bureaucracy assured the hierarchy of 
authority, the system of rules and control of the action of individuals in the 
organization. Furthermore, the employment of experts who have their specific areas 
of responsibility and the use of files ensured an amalgamation of the best knowledge 
and a record of past behaviour of the organization.  
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2.5 Inefficiency of bureaucracy 
 Although Weber (1947) claimed that the “bureaucracy” is the most efficient form 
of organization, this word has long been viewed as a negative thing to the 
organization. According to York and Henley (1986), the bureaucracy is credited with 
depersonalization, inhibiting the social worker’s pursuit of client need and restricting 
professional autonomy. In this research, the researcher has identified several studies 
about the inefficiency of bureaucracy as below. These include: 
- Beetham (1996)’s study on the inefficiency of bureaucracy 
 - Sanders (1997)’s study on the negative side of bureaucracy 
 - Merton (1940)’s model 
 - Crozier (1964)’s “Vicious Circle of bureaucratic dysfunctions” 
 - Thompson (1961)’s study on modern organization 
2.5.1 Beetham (1996)’s study on the inefficiency of bureaucracy 
Beetham (1996) claimed that the adherence to bureaucratic norms can hamper 
efficiency. This is because the principles of bureaucratic organization produce 
significant dysfunctional effects, which become more accentuated when more 
rigorously the principles are applied. The following are the dysfunctional effects of 
bureaucracy: 
- Adherence to rules can become inflexibility and red tape.  
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- Impersonality produces bureaucratic indifference and insensitivity. 
- Hierarchy discourage individual responsibility and initiative 
- Officialdom in general promote officiousness 
Apart from the above dysfunctions, Beetham (1996) also claimed that strict 
hierarchical structure can hinder the information flow, due to the direction of 
emphasis is from the top downwards, whereas the transmission of information also 
requires effective channels of communication upwards from the grass roots of the 
organization. A further defect of hierarchies is that they are constructed in a pyramidal 
fashion, narrowing as they approach the summit. It can create potentially enormous 
problems of overload and blockage in processing information in the opposite direction. 
He concluded that the most effective form of organization for experts is not a 
bureaucratic hierarchy, but a lateral network, whose discipline is maintained by 
loyalty to the organization as a whole, rather than to the narrowly defined duties of a 
specific office. 
2.5.2 Sanders (1997)’s study 
According to Sanders (1997)’s study of bureaucratic problems, bureaucracy can 
be objectively defined as administration over a contiguous area or an organization, 
using written regulations and centralized procedures. He claimed that modern 
bureaucracy can be characterized by three features which all have negative effects on 
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the organizations: 
1. Hierarchy: 
Bureaucracies had a centralized, hierarchical structure. The hierarchical 
structure clearly defined responsibilities and promulgated directives more 
quickly and clearly. Decision could be made and action taken without endless 
debate. However, the bureaucracy's hierarchical structure actually hinders the 
communication and adaptability to social evolution. The pyramids of reporting 
lines slow down communication because they channel the much more technically 
advanced information through a manager who does not understand it nor is 
anywhere near as able to make a technical decision as two staff members located 
somewhere towards the pyramid's base. 
This situation becomes especially troublesome when the speed of changes 
requires quick decisions to keep the organization on track. The pyramidal routes 
of messages up and down bureaucratic reporting lines seem even more like 
bottlenecks. 
The permanence of hierarchical structures is much less suited to today's 
post-industrial society. For post-industrial society requires flexibility and a speed 
of communication that traditional bureaucracy is hard-pressed to provide. 
Bureaucracy tends to be too permanent and inflexible for a period of rapid 
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change and unanticipated challenges. 
2. Depersonalization 
The second characteristic of modern bureaucracies is separation of the 
bureaucrat's person from the position or office he holds. The depersonalized 
bureaucracy can be traced to the attempts by central governments to strengthen their 
power by appointing new bureaucrats who, lacking their own independent power base, 
would be much more tractable. 
However, depersonalization can easily degrade into dehumanization. It 
frequently leaves the bureaucracy with the appearance of an unfamiliar, inhuman 
machine that is frightening to the customer or citizen. Since such bureaucrats speak 
for an impersonal position, not for themselves personally, they are more likely to be 
callous and unfriendly. 
3. Bureaucratic rules 
The third defining element of modern bureaucracy is its adherence to, and 
enforcement of, rules. The development of a law- or rule-based administration 
complemented the rise of impersonal bureaucracy. Laws and administrative rules 
leave less room for personal whim and discretion.  
Many of the rules seem to exist because someone thought there "ought to be a 
rule" for everything or because the procedural manual seemed a little slim. Sometimes 
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bureaucrats have bolstered their egos by assigning complex procedures and numerous 
rules to the process for which they are responsible. 
Such rules complicate and slow processing. Often it seems as though they are 
made for the sake of making rules. Complex rules can also be wielded as unfair 
weapons by certain bureaucrats who use their knowledge of the rules to justify 
whatever suits them. 
2.5.3 Merton (1940)’s model 
The best known critical commentary on Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is Merton 
(1940)’s essay titled “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”. Merton (1940) used the 
term “dysfunction” to describe the bureaucratic behaviour. He viewed bureaucratic 
structures as conducive to efficient conduct generally but prone to self-protective 
behaviour on the part of officials, which is often inefficient.  
Merton (1940) noted that the bureaucratic practices designed to produce 
efficiency will yield ritualistic or extremely rigid behaviour that detracts from 
efficiency. Bureaucratic regulations are written in far greater detail than is needed in 
most instances. He described the process as follow: 
1. An effective bureaucracy demands reliability of response and strict devotion of 
regulations. 
2. Such devotion to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes, they are 
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no longer conceived as relative to a given set of purposes. 
3. This interferes with ready adaptation under special conditions not clearly 
envisaged by those who drew up the general rules. 
4. Thus, the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce 
inefficiency in specific instances. 
He further added that the bureaucrat’s official life is planned for him in terms of 
a graded career, through organizational devices of promotion by seniority, pensions, 
incremental salaries, etc., all of which are designed to provide incentives for 
disciplined action and conformity to the official regulations. The official is tacitly 
expected to and largely does adapt his thoughts, feelings and actions to the prospect of 
this career. But these very devices which increase the probability of conformance also 
lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which induce timidity, 
conservatism and technicism. Displacement of sentiments from goals onto means is 
fostered by the tremendous symbolic significance of the means (rules). 
He also claimed that the strict adherence to rules may be transformed into a 
meaningless thing, which is called displacement of goal. That mean the original goal 
of the rules can not be sustained: 
“Adherence to rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into 
an end-in-itself, this process is know as the displacement of goals whereby an 
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instrumental value becomes a terminal value. Discipline, readily interpreted as 
conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure 
designed fro specific purpose, but becomes an immediate value in the 
life-organization of the bureaucrat.” (Merton, 1940, p. 365) 
As cited by Merton (1940), there are four causes of displacement of goal: 
1. Bureaucratic rules and regulations acquire symbolic significance apart from their 
functional value. Conformity to rules is rewarded, deviation punished. 
2. Knowledge of regulations constitutes the principal expertise of officials. The 
esprit de corps of bureaucratic depends on their special knowledge of rules. 
3. Over-conformity is the norm of impersonality. Any official appearing to bend the 
rules in order to accommodate a client’s special needs may be accused of 
favouritism, which is inconsistent with the ideal that all clients should be treated 
alike. 
4. The government agencies have no competitors, their clients cannot go elsewhere 
for the service they seek. Over-conformity incurs no costs to bureaucracies 
because of their monopoly position. 
Merton (1940) claimed that although bureaucracy constitutes a social gain, it also 
incur some human cost: “bureaucratic structure exerts a constant pressure upon the 
official to be ‘methodical, prudent and disciplined’.” Discipline is acceptable to 
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individuals only if it is congruent with the values and attitudes of those being 
disciplined. Thus, there arise “definite arrangements in the bureaucracy for 
inculcating and reinforcing” the appropriate values and attitudes. In these “definite 
arrangements” of socialization lies a hidden flaw. The disciplines and rules come to be 
regarded as “life values” rather than as utilitarian conveniences; the means become 
the ends. In place of flexible action and effective behaviour there emerges “an 
unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formalized procedures,” with 
attendant rigidity, formalism, and ritual. Over-conformity creates a malfunction both 
for the bureaucratic structure and for the individual.  
In Merton (1940)’s view, this bureaucratic organization demands formality and 
clearly defined social distance between occupants of different positions in the system. 
Because of this, people can predict the actions of others, and stable sets of mutual 
expectations emerge. “The structure is one which approaches the complete 
elimination of personalized relationships and non-rational considerations (hostility, 
anxiety, affectual involvements, etc.) Merton (1940, p.363)”. Members of 
bureaucracies are also expected to exercise prudence and self-discipline. 
Generally, Merton (1940)’s idea can be boiled down to three general propositions, 
and to three consequences or corollaries for the specific case of bureaucracy. Taken 
together, they constitute what we shall call “Merton Model”. 
 
Chapter Two Literature Review 
25 
The Merton model: 
Proposition 1. Different forms of work organization require different 
relationships, roles and rules between workers and different value 
priorities. 
Corollary. Bureaucratic organizations necessarily require rigid, hierarchical 
relationships, well-defined and specialized roles and clear cut, 
explicit rules. In bureaucracies, relationships between workers 
tend to be impersonal; and prudence, methodical action, and 
self-discipline are stressed as value.  
Proposition 2. Given positive incentives for identifying with the organization, 
and given effective socialization procedures, workers will 
necessarily take on the organization’s assumptions, procedures, 
rules and values as their own. 
Consequence.  Bureaucracies provide strong incentives for organizational 
identification, and provide strong socialization pressures and 
procedures, thus leading workers to value prudence, methodical 
action, impersonality, and rigid rules. The bureaucratic role and its 
attributes thus becomes a central part of the self system. 
Generalized, such values and self-definitions often lead to rigidity 
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and over-conformity, both at the personal and at the 
organizational level. In this way, the functional advantages of 
bureaucracy may inadvertently lead to organizational and 
personal dysfunctions. 
Proposition 3. In modern industrialized countries, bureaucracies have tended to 
become the prevalent form of work organization; this tendency 
will continue. 
Consequence.  The modal personality form in modern industrialized countries 
will increasingly conform to the “bureaucratic personality” as 
sketched above. 
By socialization and conformity, the individual comes to mirror – and sometimes 
to exaggerate – the rules of the workplace in personal conduct. 
According to Merton (1940), the over-conformity in orientation derives from 
structural sources. The process may be briefly recapitulated as follow: 
(1) An effective bureaucracy demands reliability of response and strict devotion 
to regulations.  
(2) Such devotion to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes; they 
are no longer conceived as relative to a given set of purposes. 
(3) This interferes with ready adaptation under special conditions not clearly 
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envisaged by those who drew up the general rules.  
(4) Thus, the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce 
inefficiency in specific instances.  
In conclusion, Merton (1940)’s proposition is that bureaucracy requires people to 
strictly adhere to rules and procedures so as to achieve its effectiveness. However, this 
can easily transform the rules into absolute or meaningless thing, as it renders the 
people to adapt to the change of environment. As the result, the original goal of the 
rule may be changed after a change of environment. And this rule may become an end 
itself which we called as “red tape”. 
2.5.4 Crozier (1964)’s “Vicious Circle of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions” 
The French sociologist Crozier (1964) has extended the dysfunctional aspects of 
bureaucracy to the point where bureaucratic structures are understood as inherently 
inefficient rather than as efficient instruments of administration. Based on a series of 
observational studies of public agencies, Crozier (1964) argued that modern 
bureaucracy embodies several values including the accomplishment of large-scale 
tasks but also depersonalization and removal of personal influence from human 
relationships. In the world of certainty sought by bureaucracy, rules could govern all 
contingencies, leaving little latitude for the exercise of personal decision. 
Crozier (1964) constructed a general theory of bureaucratic process. Central to 
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the theory is what Crozier (1964) calls a “Vicious circle of bureaucratic 
dysfunctions.”     
The first element in this vicious circle comprises impersonal rules, which were 
put in place to remove discretion from officials, thereby giving the appearance of 
rationality in administration. There are two types of rules existed in the organizations 
studied by Crozier (1964) as shown in the following: 
1. those specifying work behaviour in minute detail. 
2. those specifying how advancement and job allocation were to occurs. 
He claimed that these rules left little chance to save for uncontrollable events like 
machine stoppages. The few choices that did remain were forced to the highest level 
of management, so that persons making decisions could not have a personal interest in 
their outcome.  
The second element of the vicious circle is the centralization of discretionary 
decisions. The combination of detailed regulations and centralization of the few 
matters not covered by the rules yields the third element: the isolation of hierarchical 
strata from one another. One of the anomalies of large organizations is that they 
construct elaborate administrative hierarchies, which remove from lower-level 
supervisors the possibility of influencing their subordinates. Due to the line of 
command is so weak, non-hierarchical or parallel power relationships tend to emerge 
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where rules cannot cover unforeseen occurrences. Parallel power, the fourth element 
in the vicious circle, triggers demand for new rules and greater centralization of 
decisions, further weakening the line of command and opening new areas for the 
exercise of non-hierarchical influence. Crozier (1964)’s  model, thus, predicts that 
increased rules, centralization, strata isolation, and parallel power will occur and will 
lock bureaucracies into patterns of ever greater rigidity. Rather than changing with the 
environment, bureaucracies will resist change until a crisis of overwhelming 
proportions occurs. 
The crozier (1964)’s model shown that the bureaucracy can lead to a vicious 
cycle which can increase the amount of rules which is an origin of excessive rules and 
regulations in the following study. 
2.5.5 Thompson (1961)’s study on modern organization 
Thompson (1961) studied the nature of modern bureaucratic organization. He 
claimed that the modern organization, especially government has exaggerated the 
characteristics of bureaucracy which lead to the inefficiency. He pointed out that such 
exaggeration of the characteristic of bureaucracy is due to the personal insecurity and 
the need to control in order to achieve the sense of security. 
According to Thompson (1961), dependence upon specialization imparts to 
modern organizations certain qualities, including routinization, strong attachment to 
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subgoals, impersonality, categorization and resistance to change, etc. The individual 
must adjust to the characteristics of bureaucracy, because they cannot be eliminated 
from bureaucratic organization. He claimed that, in our society, there are many people 
who have been unable to make this adjustment and who therefore find modern 
organization a constant source of frustration.  
Thompson (1961) noted that personal behavior patterns are frequently 
encountered which exaggerate the characteristics of bureaucracy. Within bureaucracy, 
there are excessive aloofness, ritualistic attachment to routines and procedures, and 
resistance to change. From the standpoint of organizational goal accomplishment, 
these personal behavior patterns are pathological because they do not advance 
organizational goals. To the extent that criticism of modern bureaucracy is not 
“bureaucratic”, it is directed at these self-serving personal behavior patterns. 
Insecurity and the Need to Control 
Thompson (1961) stated that the pathologies of bureaucracy is usually resulted 
form the personal insecurity. The pathological behaviors start with a need on the part 
of the person in an authority position to control those subordinate to himself. 
According to Thompson (1961), “to control” means to have subordinate behavior 
correspond as closely as possible with one set of preconceived standards. The need to 
control arises in large part from personal insecurity. He further elaborated that the 
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source of insecurity is mainly the growing gap between the rights of authority and the 
specialized ability or skill required to solve most organizational problems.  
“The intellectual, problem-solving, content of executive positions is being increasingly 
diverted to specialists, leaving hierarchical rights as the principal components of 
executive posts. Persons in hierarchical positions are therefore increasingly 
dependent upon subordinate and non-subordinate specialists for the achievement of 
organizational goals. The superior tends to be caught between the two horns of a 
dilemma. He must satisfy the non-explicit and non-operational demands of a superior 
through the agency of specialized subordinates and non-subordinates whose skills he 
only dimly understand. To be counted a success, he must accept this dilemma and live 
with its increasing insecurity and anxiety.” Thompson (1961, p.156-157) 
The bureaupathic Reaction 
Thompson (1961) noted that insecurity gives rise to personal needs which may 
be generalized in the need for control. He indicated that this need often results in 
behavior which appears irrational from the standpoint of the organization’s goals 
because it does not advance them; it advances only personal goals and satisfies only 
personal needs. In so doing, it creates conditions which do not eliminate the need for 
control but rather enhance it. He stressed that as the insecurity and anxiety mounted, 
the personnel turned more and more to the formal system of rules, defined 
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competencies, impersonality, and close supervision. When they met resistance and 
those above and those below, increasingly insecure, they reacted with increased 
aloofness and formality and exaggerated the characteristics of bureaucratic 
organization. He illustrated a vicious cycle of this pathology: 
“The manager’s behavior was so strongly influenced by his personal needs to reduce 
his own anxiety, the employee’s responses deviated more and more from 
organizational needs, thereby increasing the manager’s anxiety and completing the 
vicious circle.” Thompson (1961, p.159) 
 He further explained that the strict control from the seniors encourages 
employees to “go by the book”, to avoid innovations and chances of errors which put 
black marks on the record. It encourages the accumulation of records to prove 
compliance. It encourages decision by precedent, and unwillingness to exercise 
initiative or take a chance. It encourages employees to wait for orders and do only 
what they are told. It is not hard to understand, therefore, why the superior may come 
to feel that he must apply more control.  
The drift to quantitative compliance 
As suggested above, an exaggerated dependence upon regulations and 
quantitative standards is likely to stem from a supervisor’s personal insecurity in the 
parent-like role of the boss. An insecure superior will probably appreciate a large 
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number of quantitative control standards because his ratings of his subordinates then 
appear to be inevitable results of the performances of the subordinates. 
2.5.6 Summary 
In the above criticisms on the bureaucracy, we can see that most of them argued the 
inefficiency produced by adherence to rigid rules and procedures. Thompson (1961) 
has provided an explanation to why the bureaucrats tend to strictly adherence to rules 
and procedures. Merton (1940) pointed out that the prescribed rules and procedures 
can easily become a meaningless thing due to the change of environment, however, 
the person who are still insisting to comply with these meaningless steps can incur an 
inefficiency to the organization. These meaningless rules and procedures are 
commonly termed as red tape. In part II, I would like to explain the phenomenon of 
“red tape” in details.
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Part II:  Review of “Red Tape” 
2.6 Definition of Red Tape 
2.6.1 Origin of red tape 
According to Kaufamn (1977), the origin of red tape is as follow: 
“Red tape derives form the ribbon once used to tie up legal documents in 
England. At that time, because the common law gives great weight to precedent, every 
judicial decision must have been preceded by a thorough search of the records of 
every transaction are punctiliously filed and cross-filed. The clerks and lawyers have 
to spend a good deal of their time tying and untying the red ribbon-bound folders. 
 Meanwhile, citizens and administrative officers trying to get action must have 
fretted and fumed while they waited for the meticulous minions to complete their 
patient unwrapping and rewrapping. And they must have exploded in outrage when, 
after all that, action was blocked on grounds of some obscure ancient decision or, still 
worse, because no unequivocal precedent could be found. 
 Hence, red tape is generally viewed a despised symbol. The ribbon has long 
since disappeared, but the hated conditions and practices it represents continue, 
keeping the symbol alive.” 
In modern society, red tape is usually used to describe excessive or meaningless 
paperwork (Bennett and Johnson 1979); a high degree of formalization and constraint 
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(Hall 1968); unnecessary rules, procedures and regulations; inefficiency; unjustifiable 
delays; and as a result from all this, frustration and vexation (Bozeman, Reed and 
Scott 1992). In common usage, red tape has a strongly negative effect on the normal 
operation.  
2.6.2 Review on the theoretical definitions of Red Tape 
In the following table, different definitions of red tape from various authors are 
reviewed. The review can give the readers a general idea of what is red tape. The 
adopted definition of red tape will be introduced in later parts. 
Table 1: Review of theoretical definitions of Red Tape 
Source: PANDEY, S. and SCOTT P. F. (2002). Red Tape: A review and assessment of concepts and measures. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 4 
 
Authors Theoretical Definition 
Buchunan (1975) There is no explicit definition of red tape. But red tape is 
adopted to describe due process and the heavy emphasis on 
rules and procedures in government organizations. 
Rosenfield (1984) Red tape is defined as “guidelines, procedures, forms and 
government interventions that are perceived as excessive, 
unwieldy, or pointless in relationship to decision making or 
implementation of decisions” 
Balwin (1990) Identifies two types of red tape: 
Formal red tape is defined as “constraints to an organization’s 
freedoms as a result of laws, rules, regulations and 
procedures.” 
Informal red tape is defined as “constraints…to an 
organization’s freedom caused by the influence, not formal 
sanctions, of key bodies in the political system”. 
Bretshneider (1990) There is no explicit definition of red tape. There is a discussion 
to highlights the procedural delay aspect. The concept of 
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procedural delay, related to many layers of oversight, can be 
thought of as a form of red tape.” 
Bozeman, Reed, and 
Scoot (1992) 
Red tape refers to the delays and subsequent irritation caused 
by formalization and stagnation. 
 
Pandey and Bretschneider 
(1997) 
Red tape is defined as a residual concept: “… the excess 
amount of delay above and beyond that generated by other 
factors influencing…time delays.” This concept specification 
tries to distinguish red-tape based delays from ordinary delays.
Rainey, Pandey and 
Bozeman (1995) 
Red Tape is defined as “rules, regulations, procedures that 
remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the 
organization but have no efficacy for the rules’s functional 
object” 
Scott and Pandey (2000) Constraints imposed by rules and procedures. 
From the above, we can see that red-tape is generally defined as a negative 
attribute to the organization. They include excessive rules, regulations, procedures and 
procedural delays. 
2.6.3 Bozeman (1996)’s classification of red tape 
According to Bozeman (1996), most of the literature about red tape can be 
classified by two views: “Bad red tape” or “good red tape”. 
“Bad Red Tape” 
 Bozeman (1996) pointed out that, in common usage, red tape is an emotive term 
connoting the worst of bureaucracy: gargantuan, cynically impersonal, bound up in 
meaningless paperwork, and beset by excessive, duplicative, and unnecessary 
procedures (Rai, 1983; Goodsell, 1985). Likewise, much of the literature on red tape 
treats it as pathology rather than a neutral organizational attribute. Juran (1967) 
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identified that the common meanings that are attached to red tape are delay, 
indecisiveness and any action that contributes to inactivity. Bennett and Johnson 
(1979) identified red tape as overly strict routine and paperwork leading to 
ineffectiveness and rigid application of rules.  
 One of the earlier studies on “bad red tape” is Merton (1940)’s classic study of 
the bureaucratic personality. Merton (1940) argues that organizational demands for 
the rule adherence lead to goal displacement among individuals working within 
bureaucratic organizations. Rules become an ends in themselves, and adherence to 
formalized procedures interferes with the adaptation of these rules to special 
circumstances. Accordingly, the rules originally designed to produce efficiency in 
general, produces inefficiency in special or exceptional circumstances. Merton (1940) 
further suggests that sustained exposure to entrenched rules creates a tendency toward 
rigidity among individuals within bureaucracy. This may occur because bureaucratic 
organizations tend to reward rule-oriented workers more than those who display less 
of a rule orientation (Edwards, 1984). Other researchers, such as Argyris(1957), 
Thompson (1961), Hummel (1982), identified red tape as a bureaucratic pathology.
 More recently, Bozeman (1993) views red tape as “good rules gone bad.” He 
examines the evolution of functional rules into dysfunctional red tape. 
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“Good Red Tape” 
 Several researchers pointed out that red tape sometimes provides benefits in the 
form of procedural safeguards that ensure accountability, predictability, and fairness 
in decisions (Kaufaman, 1977; Benveniste, 1983, 1987; Goodsell, 1985; Thompson, 
1975). Bozeman (1993) pointed out that red tape can provide citizens protection 
against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of bureaucratic power and ensures equity 
in the treatment of clients. 
Goodsell (1985) pointed out that red tape may be frustrating, however, it 
sometimes provides social benefits. Kaufman (1977) explains that the existence of 
red-tape is to ensure that government processes are representative and accountable 
and to meet the demands, often fragmented, of citizens and interest groups. Thus, part 
of the reason for red tape is the sheer number of specialized demands for government 
action. He also pointed out that process protection also gives rise to red tape. Landau 
(1969) suggested that excessive and duplicated rules and procedures can ensure the 
effective performance of the operation. However, while the extensive rules and 
procedures can confer benefits, Bozeman (1993) argued that concepts such as 
formalization should be more suitable to capture the notion of extensive but 
potentially beneficial rules and procedures.  
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2.6.4 Red tape as a bureaucratic pathology 
James and Jones (1976) stated that for the current level of theoretical knowledge 
of red tape, an articulation of useful concepts is a most important task. Based on the 
previous accumulation of literature, Bozeman (1993) concluded that Red tape is a 
bureaucratic pathology. According to Bozeman (1993), there are several reasons to 
take this view. In the first place, it is clearly consonant with popular usage. Citizens 
and organizational members discussing red-tape rarely assume that it is positive, but a 
pathology which can affect the normal operations. 
 A second reason to view red tape as pathology is that there is already a set of 
organizational concepts that deal adequately with certain empirical aspects of rules 
and procedures. The extensive literature on formalization concerns itself with rules 
and procedures, without in most instances assuming any negative implications or 
impacts of rules and procedures. Bozeman, Reed and Scott (1992) asserted that it is 
useful to view formalization as part of the “physiology” of the organization and red 
tape as a pathological aspect of that physiology. 
Bozeman (1993) defined two more concepts for the conceptualization of red tape. 
One concept pertains to the purpose for which a rule is apparently created, the other to 
its effects: 
1. Functional object of a rule: The purpose for which a rule is created. 
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2. Rule efficacy:  The extent to which a given rule addresses effectively the  
     functional object for which it was designed. 
According to the above concepts, Bozeman (1993) provided a definition to red 
tape as the follow: 
Red tape : Rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail 
a compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for  
the rules’ functional object. 
2.6.5 Adopted definition in this research  
Nowadays, many empirical researches on red tape have tended to view it as an 
organizational pathology. Red tape is described by Buchanan (1975) primarily in 
terms of excessive constraints that are largely structural in nature (e.g. procedural 
regulations). Balwin (1990) distinguished between formal and informal red tape. 
Formal red tape pertains to burdensome personnel procedures, whereas informal red 
tape concerns constraints created by such external sources as the media, public 
opinion, and political parties. Perhaps the closest to popular usage is Rosenfield 
(1984)’s definition of red tape as the sum of government guidelines, procedures, and 
forms that are perceived as excessive, unwieldy, or pointless in relation to official 
decision and policy. So, it can be concluded that the common approach is to view red 
tape as an organizational pathology which have negative effect to the organization. 
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In this research, we assume red tape is a bureaucratic pathology, and Bozeman 
(1993)’s definition of red tape will be adopted. The reason of adopting this definition 
is that it is close enough to most popular usages, so that it can avoid adding much to 
the considerable confusion already surrounding the term “red tape”. Also, according 
to Bozeman (1993), this concept has the important advantage of not viewing the 
number of rules, procedures and regulations as identical to red tape, but rather 
viewing whether it will affect the achievement of functional purpose that it serve. But 
there is one point we have to bear in mind: although most people view red tape as an 
organizational pathology, there is a need to recognize that organizational 
administrative rules, regulations and procedures are not - in either number or 
content – inherently good or bad, but only good or bad from the perspective of values 
posited. 
2.7 Operationalization of red tape 
Red tape has been operationalized in a number of ways. The oldest empirical 
work on red tape is done by Buchanan (1975), he operationalized the concept of red 
tape with a “structure salience” scale, which measure the degree of red-tape by 
examine the degree of which managers felt restricted by rules. Rainey, Pandey, and 
Bozeman (1995) used four operational measures of red-tape which include the 
following:  
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1. Global measure of red tape 
2. Personnel Red Tape measure 
3. Administrative-Delay based red-tape measure 
4. Number of approvals-based red tape measure. 
The global measure of red tape was made up of a single question that uses a 
global referent: effectiveness of the organization as a whole. The concept of red tape 
is operationalized as the burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have 
negative effects on the organization’s effectiveness. The personnel red-tape measure is 
an attitudinal measure of red-tape which was based on managerial perceptions 
regarding personnel systems. Administrative-Delay based red-tape measure based on 
the time required for execution a task. Number of approvals-based red-tape measure 
based on the number of approvals required before an action can be taken. (Rainey 
1983, Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman 1995; Pandey and Kingsley 2000). For the details 
about the operational definitions of red tape, please refer to the table 5 in the Chapter 
four. 
2.8 Causes of red tape 
There are not many researches to study about the causes of red tape. The most 
complete one is “A theory of government red tape” by Bozeman (1993). In this study, 
Bozeman (1993) has conducted an intensive research on the government 
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organizations in USA. It is identified the degree of red tape in these organizations is 
quite serious and he has derived two main categories for the causes of red tape: 
2.8.1 Rule-Inception Red Tape: “Rules Born Bad” 
Some rules are red tape at their inception because they meet the requirements 
specified earlier – having compliance burden while not addressing the function object. 
The term “rule-inception red tape” is used for rules that are dysfunctional at their 
origin. Bozeman also provided the following reasons for the emergence of this kind of 
red tape: 
1. Inadequate comprehension 
Many dysfunctional rules have their origins in the misunderstanding of the 
relation between means and ends. According to Bozeman, in many instances, 
the reason for the inefficacy of rules is that persons designing the rules have 
insufficient understanding of the problem at hand, the relationship of the 
rule to the perceived problem, or other’s likely application or response to 
the rule. 
2. Self-aggrandizement and illegitimate functions. 
The concept of red tape assumes that rules should serve a legitimate, 
organizationally sanctioned functional object, either for the focal 
organization or for a legitimate controller of the organization. Thus a rule 
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that is efficacious for an individual or group but which serves an illegitimate 
function, such as self-aggrandizement, qualifies as red tape, even if the rule 
is very effective for the illegitimate function. 
3. Negative sum compromise 
In some instances, rules are established that serves so many diverse 
functional objectives that the net result is to produce a compliance burden 
but not enhance any of the functional objects it is designed to serve.  
4. Over-control 
Over-control is the most common reason that rules are “born bad”. 
Managerial control is an important organizational value and usually a 
legitimate one. However, it is also a value especially likely to be 
overemphasized. 
2.8.2 Rule-evolved Red Tape: “Good Rules Gone Bad” 
Bozeman (1993) identified the following factors which may lead to the evolution 
of rules into red tape, including: 
 1. Rule drift 
Rule drift occurs when the meaning and spirit of the rule get lost in 
organizational antiquity or when individuals inadvertently change the rule 
or its meaning. Sometimes, individuals enforce rules or comply with them 
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without they serve. Perhaps the need for the rule no longer exists. Rules 
may be observed ritualistically and even may be venerated without anyone 
knowing what function they serve other than ritual. 
2. Rule entropy 
Rule entropy occurs as rules get passed from one organization to the next 
and one person to the next. The more organizations, organizational levels, 
and jurisdictions involved in rule promulgation and application, the more 
likely the meaning will be lost through entropy and the more likely red tape 
will result. 
3. Change in implementation. 
Change in implementation occurs if the rule itself stays essentially the same 
but individuals begin to implement it in a different manner. 
4. Change in functional object 
The functional object of the rule changes in ways that render the rule 
obsolete or otherwise useless. 
5. Change in the rule’s efficacy 
Even if the functional object does not change, circumstances which mitigate 
the rule’s usefulness can occur. For example, a rule requiring carbon copies 
of memoranda makes little sense if almost all communication is via 
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electronic mail on a computer-based local area network. This example 
illustrates not a change in the functional object itself but a change in the 
rule’s efficiency for the functional object. 
6. Rule strain 
Organizations with too high a rule density level create strain and inefficient 
use of resources. Rules that are good but are too abundant can have a net 
negative effect. 
7. Accretion 
Rules build one on top of another. Accretion means that the rules have an 
impact that is more than the sum of their parts. Rationality added to 
rationality may sum to irrationality. 
8. Misapplication 
Misapplication of rules can occur for any of a variety of reasons. Sometimes 
rules may be difficult to interpret or apply because they have been written 
poorly and thus quickly evolve into red tape. Sometimes the purpose of a 
rule has never been clearly communicated to the person charged with its 
enforcement. 
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Part III:  Comparison of “bureaucracy” and “red tape” in public  
   and private organizations 
2.9 Nature differences of public and private Organizations 
Similarities and differences between the public and private sector have 
frequently been debated in the literatures on public administration, politics and 
economics. The main conventional distinction between public and private 
organizations is their ownership (Rainey et al.,. 1976). Whereas private firms are 
owned by entrepreneurs or shareholders, public agencies are owned collectively by 
members of political communities. The distinction is associated with two further 
public/private contrasts. First, unlike their private counterparts, public agencies are 
funded largely by taxation rather than fee paid directly by customers (Niskanen, 1971; 
Walmsley and Zald, 1973). Secondly, public sector organizations are controlled 
predominantly by political forces, not market forces. In other words, the primary 
constraints are imposed by the political system rather than the economic system (Dahl 
and Lindblom, 1953). Therefore the distinction between private and public 
organization are mainly: ownership, funding and control. 
2.10 Theoretical Impacts of publicness on organizations 
Boyne (2002) has identified the impacts of publicness on the organization from a 
variety of academic sources that contain claims concerning the distinctiveness of 
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public agencies (Allison, 1979; Antonsen and Jorgensen, 1997; Box, 1999; Bozeman, 
1987; Fottler, 1981; Metcalfe, 1993; Newman and Wallender, 1978; Rainey, 1989; 
Rainey et al., 1976; Ring and Perry 1985; Stewart and Ranson, 1988). Four main 
theoretical effects of publicness on the organizational structure have been identified in 
the literature on the differences between public and private management. These 
concern the relationship between publicness and organizational environments, 
organizational goals, organizational structures and the values of managers. In this 
research, focus is only put on the impact of publicness on the organizational structure, 
because it is directly related to the bureaucracy and red tape. 
2.10.1 The impact of Publicness on organizational structures.  
According to Boyne (2002), the internal characteristics of public agencies can be 
viewed as distinctive in the following ways: 
z More bureaucracy. 
Organizations in the public sector have more formal procedures for decision 
making, and are less flexible and more risk-averse than their private sector 
counterparts (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Farnham and Horton, 1996). These 
characteristics of public agencies reflect ‘the lack of rewards or incentives for 
successful innovations and the penalties for violation of established procedures’ 
(Fottler, 1981, p.5). Bureaucratic structures may also stem from the requirements 
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of monitoring bodies and from demands for accountability in the public sector. 
As Rainey et al. (1976, p. 238) note, ‘the coercive nature of most government 
actions might be cited as a fundamental justification for constitutional checks 
and balances and extensive formal control mechanisms’. 
z More red tape 
This is often regarded as a pathological side-effect of bureaucracy (Bozeman and 
Scott, 1996). The existence of red tape implies an unnecessary and 
counter-productive obsession with rules rather than results, and with processes 
instead of outcomes. Bozeman et al. (1992, p.291) argue that ‘just as the original 
annoyance with red tape resulted from the delay caused by untying and tying the 
tape surrounding (official documents, red tape today refers not to rules and 
procedures themselves but to the delays and subsequent irritation caused by 
formalization and stagnation’. 
2.10.2 The impact of publicness on organizational structures: Empirical  
evidence 
Boyne (2002) has reviewed a number of empirical studies about the impact of 
publicness on organizational structure. 19 empirical studies have examined whether 
organizational structures differ significantly between public agencies and private 
firms. The statistical results provide some supports for the structural hypotheses, but 
the balance of the evidence is not overwhelming (see Table 2.1). Although the 
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unweighted mean support score is as high as 60 percent, the weighted mean is only 38 
per cent.  
Table 2  Previous empirical studies on the impact of publicness on organization structure 
Source: BOYNE, G. A. (2002). Public and private management: What’s the difference. Journal of Management Studies 39(1) 
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2.11 Comparison of the degrees of bureaucracy in public and  
private organizations 
Eleven studies have tested the hypothesis that public organizations are more 
bureaucratic. Six of these find strong support for this hypothesis (Emmert and Crow, 
1988; Holdaway et al., 1975; Lan and Rainey, 1992; Rainey, 1983; Scott and Falcone, 
1998; Zeffane, 1994). However, Buchanan’s (1975) results suggest that the role of 
rules and regulations is stronger in private organizations, and Lachman (1985) finds 
that managers in private firms are more subject to bureaucratic controls. Such 
evidence is consistent with Knott’s (1993, p.95) argument that ‘successful private 
companies…employ extensive bureaucracy to deliver services. McDonalds 
Corporation prescribes volume of rules for everything from the ordering of 
hamburgers to the cleaning of restrooms and floors. The firm’s operations manual has 
600 pages and weighs four pounds’. Thus doubts remain about the relative 
bureaucratization of the two sectors.  
The literature shown that the hypothesis “Public organization is more 
bureaucratic than private organization” cannot be generalized to every case. It is due 
to the fact that some private organizations are actually more bureaucratic than the 
government organizations.  
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2.12 Comparison of the degrees of red tape in public and private 
organizations 
 The relationship between publicness and red tape has been tested in four 
empirical studies. The concept of red tape is operationalized as ‘procedureal delay, 
related to many layers of oversight’ (Bretschneider, 1990, p. 537). In all four studies, 
it is claimed that the results support the red tape hypothesis, but the evidence is not 
always consistent with this conclusion. For example, the support score in Rainey et al. 
(1995) is only 31 percent. The only study that provides very strong support for this 
publicness hypothesis is Bretschneider (1990)’s  comparison of public and private 
organizations in the US computing industry. He finds that decisions in public agencies 
take longer, particularly decisions on the appointment or dismissal of staff.  
 Wider evidence on the autonomy of public and private managers over personnel 
issue is provided by three of the empirical studies. The statistical results are again 
mixed, and show patchy support for the hypothesis of lower managerial autonomy in 
the public sector. Rainey (1979)’s and Balwin (1990b)’s conclusions that personnel 
procedures are less flexible in the public sector are based on only one and two tests 
respectively. Under half of the results are consistent with this finding in the other two 
studies (Chubb and Moe, 1988; Pugh et al., 1968). Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that none of the evidence suggests that managerial discretion over personnel decisions 
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is greater in the public sector. 
 Boyne (2002) has identified a general pattern of evidence on the effects of 
publicness on organizational structure which is summarized in Table 3. The table 
shows the number of studies with support scores in of three categories: zero, <50% 
and >50%. The last category can be taken to represent moderate to strong support for 
a difference between private firms and public agencies. Among the three hypothesis 
of the publicness effect on organizational structure, the one which have support scores 
of 50 percent or more is only: “public organizations are more bureaucratic.” 
Table 3 General pattern of evidence of the effects of publicness on organizational structure 
  0 ≤50% >50% 
H1  Public organization is more bureaucratic than private organizations 2 1 8 
H2  Public organization has more red tape than private organization 0 2 2 
H3  Manager in public organization has lower managerial autonomy 0 2 2 
Note: 
1. Figures show number of studies with support scores of zero, less than or equal to 50%, or more than 50%. 
Source: BOYNE, G. A. (2002). Public and private management: What’s the difference. Journal of Management Studies 39(1) 
From the table, we can see that there is a strong support to say that public 
organizations is more bureaucratic than private organization while public 
organizations are not necessarily have more red tape than private organizations
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2.13 Bozeman (2000)’s study on the different degree of red tape in  
  public and private organizations 
A commonly cited difference between public and private organizations is that 
public organizations are more bureaucratic and have more red tape. The empirical 
literature on public and private organizational difference provides support for the 
above proposition (Baldwin 1990; Bozeman, Reed and Scott 1991; Bozeman and 
Bretschneider 1994; Bretschneider 1990; Bretschneider and Bozeman 1995; Rainey 
1979 and 1983; Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman 1995). It is cited commonly that the 
rationale for presumably higher levels of red tape in the pubic sector is that public 
organizations are subject to greater levels of accountability than private firms and, 
hence, face greater operating constraints that are manifested in the form of rules and 
red tape. In addition, goals in the public sector are considered more diffuse and vague. 
Accordingly, public manager rely more extensively upon rule compliance as a means 
of control and as a benchmark for effective performance (Buchanan, 1975; Thompson, 
1961; Warwick, 1975). Bozeman (2000) argued that, even if there is a genuine 
tendency for greater red tape in government, this does not prevent some private 
organizations from having more red tape than similar government agencies. There are 
many government organizations with little red tape and private organizations with a 
great deal.  
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2.13.1 Causes of more red tape in public organization 
Bozeman (2000) proposed that when organizations have high degree of the 
following two factors: 
1) external control 
2) large number of stakeholders,  
they would have a greater likelihood of red tape. This implies that red tape is not an 
inexorable consequence of government ownership. It is because when these factors 
are present in any organization, government or business, more red tape is usually the 
result.  
But, actually, there are inherent attributes of public organizations that lead to 
higher degrees of external control and larger number of diverse stakeholders, so a 
higher propensity for red tape is resulted. The inherent attributes are government’s 
sovereign political authority, and governments’ breadth of mission. 
2.13.2 Sovereign political authority of government 
Bozeman (1987) asserted that the only absolute difference between government 
organizations and private organizations is the high degree of publicness of 
government. He pointed out that sovereignty carries it legitimate power of such force 
that citizens inevitably demand sharp constraints on government official and 
safeguards. Kaufman (1977)’s  analysis of red tape note that the procedural 
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safeguards lead to the proliferation of rules, regulations and procedures. 
 According to Bozeman (2000), a set of rules protecting citizens from official 
abuse is not red tape. However, a set of rules devised to protect citizens from official 
abuse, but not meeting that purpose, may be red tape. One of the reasons that 
government has more red tape is that it has voluminous rules designed to protect 
citizens from the illegitimate uses of the legitimate powers of government and, 
sometimes, the rules simply do not work. Bozeman (2000) noted that by using the 
concepts developed to explain the etiology of red tape, it can be shown that there are 
certain causes of red tape that are particularly likely to arise in the case of procedural 
safeguards. 
 First, there is a strong likelihood of accretion because procedural safeguards 
almost invariably involve cross-cutting goals – they affect the same officials and the 
same missions as do policy goals. When officials find ways to reduce the efficacy of 
the procedural safeguards, the residue is red tape.  
 Secondly, inadequate comprehension is often a problem because those 
interpreting or applying procedural safeguards easily can lose sight of the purposes of 
the rule, focusing instead on mindless compliance.  
 Third is rule strain. In many instances, the sheer number of procedural 
safeguards, many of which are quite specific and detailed, produce an extensive 
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compliance burden and, for organizations with limited resources, a high rule density. 
2.13.3 Breath of mission 
 According to Bozeman (2000), another inherent attribute of government that 
leads to more red tape is the nature of government policy missions. He noted that, the 
inter-organizational linkage is associated with red tape. In the private sector, 
inter-organizational linkages typically occur among autonomous organizations 
seeking mutual economic advantage. In government, inter-organizational linkages 
often seek to achieve broad policy missions that transcend the linked government 
organizations and, thus, the linkage is qualitatively different. This qualitative 
difference means that linkage mechanisms require a different sort of 
inter-organizational “glue” – glue that can easily turn out to serve as the adhesive to 
red tape. 
2.14 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, Bozeman (2000) told us that there are few reasons to explain why 
government must have more red tape than private organizations, but there are several 
good reasons why there is a stronger likelihood of red tape in government. What we 
can say is that the more rules will likely mean more red tape. When these rules are 
complex and when they are imposed from the outside, the probabilities become 
greater. 
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Chapter Three - Research Questions and hypotheses 
 There were many debates on the topic of whether public organizations are more 
bureaucratic and have more red tape than private organizations. Generally, most of the 
studies supported the hypothesis that “public organizations are more bureaucratic and 
have more red tape than the private organization”. However, this hypothesis still 
cannot be generalized to explain all situations, since, some studies have provided 
empirical evidences to refute the hypothesis and support the fact that some private 
organizations are even more bureaucratic and have more red tape. 
Recently, some authors proposed some theoretical explanations to support the 
hypothesis, for example, the propositions of “Publicness Impact” by Boyne (2000) 
and “The Government’s political authority and breadth of missions” by 
Bozeman(2000). These can be regarded as a very strong support to the hypothesis.  
In the general context, the proposition of “higher degree of bureaucracy and red 
tape” still cannot be justified. However, this proposition is not tested in the context of 
construction project organization. Thus, in this research, the researchers would like to 
test this hypothesis within the construction industry. If the hypothesis can be justified 
in the construction industry, this can further support the propositions. The research 
question is “Whether the public project organization has more bureaucracy and red 
tape than the private project organization?” Two hypotheses are formed accordingly: 
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H1 : The public project organizations have a higher degree of bureaucracy  
  than private project organization. 
H2 : The public project organizations have a higher degree of red tape 
  than private project organization. 
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Chapter Four   Methodology 
4.1 Outline of research methodology 
 The methodology employed in this research is mainly based on the literature 
review and the methods adopted in previous studies, so its validity can be enhanced. 
The research methodology can generally be divided into two parts. The first part is to 
measure the degree of bureaucracy and red tape in public and private project 
organizations by a subjective approach, the method adopted is a questionnaire survey. 
The second part is to use an objective approach to cross-validate the result from the 
first part, the method adopted is a case-study method. The methods devised are 
mainly used to test the two proposed hypotheses and exploit any extra findings from 
the data available. 
Testing of hypothesis 1 
 In order to test hypothesis 1, the degrees of bureaucracy in public and private 
project organization are measured. The method of measurement is to employ the 
questionnaire first. Campbell and Fiske (1959) noted that, a convergent validation 
should be adopted to validate the method of measurement. This is an approach which 
employs more than one method of data collection to see whether a particular way of 
measuring a concept converges with other measures. Therefore, in this research, the 
result from this subjective approach would be cross-validated by an objective 
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approach. The method adopted for the objective approach is case study method. The 
details of questionnaire survey and case study would be discussed in later sections. 
Testing of hypothesis 2 
 In order to test hypothesis 2, the degrees of red-tape in public and private project 
organizations have to be measured and compared. If the measured degree of red-tape 
in public project organization is higher than that of private project organization, then 
the hypothesis will be justified. According to Bozeman (2002), red tape depends on 
one’s perspective and assessment of red tape requires judgement call, thus, the 
measurement of red tape can only be based on subjective approach. Same as 
measuring bureaucracy, the measurement of red tape is also done by using 
questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 4: Research Plan 
 
 
Testing of hypotheses 1 and 2 by measuring the degree of bureaucracy and red tape 
in public and private project organizations by a subjective approach. 
Pilot Study 
 
- 
 
To investigate the perceptions of the project participants 
on bureaucracy and red tape. 
- 
 
To measure the degree of bureaucracy in private and 
public project organization  
Part 1 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
- To measure the degree of red-tape in private and public 
project organization 
Testing of hypothesis 1 by measuring the degree of bureaucracy in public and 
private project organizations by an objective approach 
Part 2 
Case Study  
- 
To measure the degree of bureaucracy in private and 
public project organization 
 
Chapter Four Methodology 
 
62 
 
 
Part 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
            Part 2 
 
Figure 1: Flow Chart representation of methodology 
 
4.2 Type of the projects to be compared 
In this research, the type of the project organization to be compared should be 
fixed. It is because the comparison between different types of project organization 
may affect the assessment of degree of bureaucracy and red tape. For example, it is 
not appropriate to directly compare a civil engineering project organization with a 
building project organization, because their organizational structures and working 
procedures are totally different. Therefore, the type of the project to be compared 
should be fixed. In this research, the researcher aims at compare the degree of red tape 
and bureaucracy in public and private project organization, therefore, a common type 
of project organization should be identified from public and private sector. 
According to the website of Architectural Service Department (2003), the public 
construction projects in Hong Kong can mainly be classified by the following types: 
1. Government office 
T-test
Data collection 
(Questionnaire) 
Data analysis Correlational analysis 
ANOVA
Case study Result Cross-validate 
Identification of 
sample 
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2. Housing projects 
3. Amenities projects 
4. Civil Engineering projects 
5. School projects  
6. Others, such as police station, school projects and amenities projects…etc. 
On the other hand, the private construction project can generally be classified by 
three types:  
1. Residential 
2. Commercial 
3. Industrial.  
In this research, the Housing Authority project organization and the private 
residential development project organization are chosen for the comparison, because 
they are similar in nature and it can be assumed that they have similar working stages 
and procedures to follow.  
As a result, the respondents who have both experiences in public housing projects 
and private residential development projects will be asked to evaluate the degree of 
bureaucracy and red tape in Housing Authority projects and private residential 
projects. 
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4.3 Questionnaire Survey 
For examining hypotheses 1 and 2, questionnaires will be employed. Self 
reporting, either from questionnaires or from interviews, is a common technique in 
industrial/organizational psychology and organizational studies (Leary 1991 p.44). 
Since the questions used to determine the degree of red-tape in public and private 
organization are relatively straight forward and it is best to obtain a large number of 
responses in a relatively short time, also self-administered questionnaires are 
invariably cheaper than interviews, therefore questionnaire approach is more feasible 
than conducting interviews.  
However, according to Cheung (1999), there are several shortcomings of using 
questionnaires: 
1. Usually, a low response rate is expected and the sample size may not be large 
enough to represent the population. Therefore, in order to encourage the response 
rate, the following will be done: 
- Introductory letters are sent to the participants so as to explain the objective 
and purpose of the questionnaire and provide guidance for filling in the 
questionnaires. The author’s personal contact number is also included for 
answering any queries. 
- The targeted organizations are phoned before sending the questionnaires. 
This help to identify a contact person and obtain prior consent before 
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distributing the questionnaires. 
- Respondents are encouraged to reply by email, which is more convenient 
for them.  
- Respondents are not asked for disclose personal information to protect he 
confidentiality. 
2. Misinterpretation of questions may be likely. However, this problem is actually 
not so serious in this survey, since the targeted respondents are highly educated 
professionals. Nonetheless, questionnaires are written in a simple and 
straight-forward manner which facilitates understanding. In the following, the 
sample for the survey and the designs of the questions to measure the degree of 
bureaucracy and red-tape in the public and private project organizations are 
discussed 
 
4.3.1 Sample for the questionnaire survey 
  To measure the degree of bureaucracy and red tape in public and private project 
organization, the first priority of the respondents is that they must be a project 
participant. Furthermore, as the respondents have to answer several question based on 
their experiences, they should have working experiences in both private and public 
project organizations.  
Besides, the respondents should not have any bias when answering the questions. 
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Therefore, the personnel from the client’s organization are not selected as the sample, 
otherwise they have to evaluate against their organization and the result may be 
biased.  
 Furthermore, Oppenheim (1986) indicated the chief danger of subjective 
measurement is that the respondents’ perspective can easily be influenced by other 
variables. For example, when the respondents are come from two different disciplines, 
it is more likely that they will have different perceptions on the same issue. Thus, the 
extraneous variables can influence their assessment. In order to minimize the 
influence of those extraneous variables, some variables should be fixed as constant, 
such as, the type of their organization and position. 
 In this research, among the project participants, the construction manager and 
project consultants in Hong Kong are the selected as the sample. The reasons include 
the following: 
1. They are the participants in the project team organization, so they are more 
familiar with the rules, procedures and structure in the project organization. 
2. They are independent from the client’s side, therefore they are less likely to have 
bias in evaluating the private and public project organizations. 
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4.3.2 Identification of the sample 
First of all, to identify the construction managers who have both experiences in 
public and private housing projects, the contractors who have experiences for the two 
types of projects should be identified first. The names and contacts of these 
contractors are identified in the approved list of Housing Authority Building 
Contractors. After that, all contractors in the approved list are contacted by phone to 
see whether they would like to participate in the research. For those contractors who 
are interested to participate in the research, the researcher would request for a list of 
construction managers’ contacts and so on, the questionnaires are sent to these 
construction managers through email. The collection method is also through email as 
stated in the questionnaire. 
 For the consultants, architects were chosen as the sample in this study. Their 
contacts are identified from the list of Hong Kong Institute of Architects. Since, there 
is no prescribed list for Housing Authority projects, thus the researcher has to ask the 
respondents whether they have the experiences in both Housing Authority and Private 
residential projects in the questionnaires. 
 
4.3.3 Pilot study 
Before any in-depth investigation, a pilot study is conducted in order to have a 
general picture about the respondents’ knowledge and perception on the bureaucracy 
and red tape in public and private organization. It is considered as an important step, 
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because if these groups of people have never heard of such terms, the researcher has 
to spend more time on the definition and meaning of the terms before conducting 
subsequent questionnaires. On the other hand, if they have different perceptions on 
the red tape, additional steps should be taken to solve this semantic differential 
problem.  
Target of pilot interview 
Three construction managers who have experiences in both private and public 
housing projects were contacted and interviewed by the researcher to find out their 
understanding about bureaucracy and red tape. The three interviewees come from (1) 
Hsin Chong Construction Company Limted. (2) Sun Fook Kong Construction Limited 
and (3) China State Construction and Engineering Company Limited respectively. 
They are all involved in the industry for a long period of time, therefore it is worth to 
consult them before conducting the questionnaire survey. Personal interviews are 
conducted to investigate their perception on the bureaucracy and red tape in the 
project organizations. The questions asked are open-ended which include the 
following: 
1. Whether they have the idea about “bureaucracy” and “red tape”? 
2. How do they compare the degree of “red tape” and “bureaucracy” in private and 
public project organizations? 
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3. Do they perceive “red tape” as a positive thing or negative thing? 
Findings from the pilot study 
 
Interview 1: Mr. Benjanmin Chow, Construction Manager of Hsin Chong 
Construction Company Limited 
He has more than 20 years experience in the construction industry. When he was 
asked whether he has the idea about “bureaucracy” and “red tape”, he answered “yes” 
for “bureaucracy”, but “no” for “red tape”. However, when the researcher explained 
the concept of red tape in terms of “excessive rules and procedures which do not serve 
any purpose”, he replied that he had this experience before. In his view, the existence 
of red tape can absolutely reduce the efficiency of the project and waste a lot of 
resources including time and money. For the comparison of the degree of bureaucracy 
and red tape between Housing Authority and private project organizations, he asserted 
that the projects of Housing Authority has an especially high degree of bureaucracy 
and red tape among other type of projects. He said that reason behind is mainly due to 
the poor performance of public housing project in recent years. In addition, he pointed 
out that the topic of this study is quite interesting and worth investigating, as there are 
not many studies to reveal this kind of problems in the industry.  
 
Interview 2: Mr. K M Fung, Senior Construction Manager of Sun Fook Kong 
Construction Company Limited 
He has nearly 15 years of experience in the industry. Again, he is unfamiliar with 
the term of “red tape”, but he said in some government projects, especially the 
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projects of Housing Authority, there were actually the existence of excessive rules and 
regulations. In contrary to Mr. Kwok’s view, he treat red tape as a positive attribute 
which can provide a greater security and guarantee to the smoothness of the project. 
He advised that the term red tape should be defined in detail, so that the respondents 
can understand the term more easily and give a more accurate answer. 
Interview 3: Mr. Eddy Ho, Construction Manager of China State Construction and 
Engineering Company Limited. 
He has about 15 years of experience in the industry. He said he knows the 
concept of “bureaucracy”, but he didn’t get in touch with the term “red tape” before. 
He agrees that excessive rules and regulations actually exist in some project 
organizations, especially for government projects. He viewed red tape as a negative 
attribute to the project as he thought that adherence to excessive rules and procedures 
can cause procedural delay and result in poor quality of work. He pointed out that the 
degree of red tape is especially high in public housing project and there is a need for 
the Housing Authority to review its system of rules and procedures, otherwise, the 
money of taxpayers will continue to be wasted. 
Conclusion 
From the pilot study, we can see that all three interviewees are familiar with the 
term ‘bureaucracy’, but not for “red tape”, thus, it is necessary to provide definitions 
and explanations of the “red tape” in the questionnaire. Also, an example of red tape 
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should better be given in order to enhance the understanding of the interviewees. 
Their perception on red tape is quite different. Mr. Chow and Mr. Ho viewed red tape 
negatively while Mr. Fung viewed red tape positively. Thus, the design of the 
questionnaire has to address this problem. 
 
4.3.4 Structure of questionnaire 
 The questionnaire is divided two sections. The first section aims at measuring the 
degree of bureaucracy in Housing Authority and private residential project 
organizations, while the second part aims at measuring the degree of red tape. Most of 
the questions are based on the instruments adopted in previous researches. This can 
ensure that the questions asked are theoretically based and help to avoid ambiguity, 
vagueness and inappropriate use of technical expressions. Modification or 
supplements have been made to the questions to improve the clarification of the 
questions, provided such changes would not alter the original aim of the questions. In 
the following, the designs of the questions in each section are to be elaborated in 
detail: 
Section 1:  Questions to measure the degree of bureaucracy 
(i) Instruments to measure the degree of bureaucracy 
 In the National Administrative Studies Project (NASP), Bozeman and Rainey 
(1998); Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman (1995) have conducted questionnaires survey 
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research to measure the degree of bureaucracy in public and private organizations. 
Hundreds of questionnaires were sent to government and private organizations. They 
have carried an extensive review on the previous literature about bureaucracy and 
identified the following five features of bureaucracy as the instruments for measuring 
bureaucracy in the organizations. The five bureaucratic features include the following: 
6. Layers of Hierarchy 
7. Degree of specialization 
8. Number of approvals needed to perform a task 
9. Amount of written rules and procedures 
10. Number of record keeping 
 
Actually, before their research, York and Henley (1986) had already adopted the 
above instruments to measure the degree of bureaucracy in the public organizations. 
In this research, the instruments adopted to measure the degree of bureaucracy are 
also based on the above five bureaucratic features identified in the literature review. 
These instruments for measuring the degree of bureaucracy are to be adopted in both 
questionnaire and case study.  
(ii) Scaling method 
According to Oppenheim (1996), rating gives a numerical value to some kind of 
judgement. Interval scale will be employed as it can indicate the order of responses 
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and distances between them.  
 As noted by Bell (1993), a even-number scale should be used, as the neutral 
position of respondents can be avoided. This can force people to make a decision in a 
particular direction, instead of avoiding the answer. Therefore, in this questionnaire, 
an eight-point rating scale will be used to allow the respondents to assess the degree 
of bureaucracy in Housing Authority and private project organizations. 
In section 1 of the questionnaire, the respondents are requested to give a rating to 
the five bureaucratic features according to their experience in the two types of project 
organization. The higher rating indicates a higher degree of bureaucratic feature. For 
each questionnaire, the rating for each bureaucratic feature will be summed up to 
produce a total score for the degrees of bureaucracy in private and public organization 
can be produced respectively.  
Section 2: Questions to measure the degree of red tape 
(i) Instruments to measure the degree of red tape 
The oldest empirical work on red tape is done by Buchanan (1975), he measured 
the existence of red tape with a “structure salience” scale, which measure the degree 
of red-tape by examine the degree of which managers felt restricted by rules. Rainey, 
Pandey, and Bozeman (1995) used four operational measures of red-tape which 
include the following:  
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5. Global measure of red tape 
6. Personnel Red Tape measure 
7. Administrative-Delay based red-tape measure 
8. Number of approvals-based red tape measure. 
Table 5 presents the exact wording as well as the computation step taken to come 
up with each measure. The global measure of red tape was made up of a single 
question that uses a global referent: effectiveness of the organization as a whole. The 
personnel red-tape measure is an attitudinal measure of red-tape which was based on 
managerial perceptions regarding personnel systems. Administrative-Delay based 
red-tape measure based on the time required for execution a task. Number of 
approvals-based red-tape measure based on the number of approvals required before 
an action can be taken. Pandey and Scott (2002) have undergone a critical review on 
these measurements of red-tape. They have examined whether these measures of red 
tape based on the same reality by examining the inter-correlations among different 
measures of red tape and between them and Weberian characteristics. The results 
concluded that the Buchanan (1975)’s “structural salience” scale, global measure of 
red tape, personnel red-tape measure, number of Approval-Based Red Tape Measure 
and administrative delay-based measure of red-tape tape into similar aspects of 
reality and represent equally valid approaches to measuring red-tape. 
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In this research, the personnel red-tape measure is considered not appropriate, as 
it only considers the red-tape in personnel systems which cannot provide a general 
picture of red-tape in the project organization. Pandey and Scott (2002) pointed out 
that there are two problems with administrative delay-based measure. The first 
problem is that it only captures the processing time. However, the processing time 
does not seem to capture a negative which is a key component of the theoretical 
definition. Another problem is that the time it takes to perform key managerial tasks 
only provides an indirect and implicit measure of red-tape; administrative delay is 
neither separately identifiable nor is it the only factor contributing to delays. Thus, 
administrative delay-based measure will also not be adopted in this research. 
As a result, Buchanan’s “structural salience” scale, global measure to measure 
and number of Approval-Based Red Tape Measure would be adopted as the 
instruments to measure the red-tape in public and private project organization.  
Table 5:  Operation definitions to measure red tape in previous studies 
Buchanan’s (1975) “structure salience” scale 
Respondents were asked to rate the following items on a 6-point Likert scale. 
1. My supervisor is more concerned that I follow rules and procedures than he is than I do 
an effective job. 
2. I feel that rules, regulations, and procedures are very important in this organization. 
3. I always check things carefully with my boss before making important decision. 
4. It is considered inappropriate in this organization to try to deal with a problem without 
following prescribed rules and procedures.  
Global Measure of Red Tape (Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman, 1995) 
Based on a rating from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest level of red-tape of the 
following statement. If red-tape is defined as burdensome administrative rules and 
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procedures that have negative effects on the organization’s effectiveness, how would you 
assess the level of red-tape in your organization? 
Personnel Red-Tape Measure (Rainey 1983, Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman 1995; 
Pandey and Kingsley 2000) 
Sum of the following items rated on a 4-point likert scale, with 1 indicating strong agreement, 
were used to measure personnel red-tape. 
1. Even if a manager is a poor performance, formal rules make it hard to remove him or her 
from the organization. 
2. The rules governing promotion make it hard for a good manager to move up faster than 
a poor one. 
3. Due to rules, pay raises fro managers are based more on longevity than on 
performance. 
4. The formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher 
pay here. The personnel rules and procedures that govern my organization make it 
easier for superiors to reward subordinates for good performance. 
Administrative Delay-Based Red Tape Measure 
Respondents were asked to indicate the time taken between the initiation of the request 
made by a unit within the organization and the actual approval of the request. 
Number of Approval-Based Red Tape Measure 
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of persons in the organization who must 
typically approve each activity before action can be taken 
 
(ii) Semantic-differential problems 
According to Waldo (1959 p. 369), “one man’s red tape is another man’s system”. 
This different perception of respondents on rules and procedures will affect the 
measurement of red-tape. This is called semantic differential impacts of red-tape. The 
semantic differential problem will certainly affect the assessment of red tape in public 
and private project organization by the respondents, so the result may be unreliable. If 
somebody views red-tape as a positive attribute to the organization, this would 
contradict the proposition in the literature that “red-tape is a negative attribute to the 
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organization”. Also, they are sceptical to work in an environment with more red-tape 
and can hardly realize its existence.  
In order to investigate the respondents’ perceptions on red-tape, the 
semantic-differential technique will be employed. The semantic-differential technique 
was originally developed by Charles E. Osgood and his colleagues (1957). It consists 
of a number of rating scales that are bipolar, with each extreme defined by an 
adjective which aims at determining the perceptions of different people on the same 
matter. Simple profile-analysis can show us the different ways which several objects 
or concepts are rated on the same set of scales and how two or more groups differ in 
these respects. 
In the questionnaire, there is a question which is designed to ask the respondents 
whether red-tape is a good thing or not. For those respondents who view red tape as a 
good thing to the project, their response would not be chosen for study, as this 
perception do not conform with the commonly adopted perception identified in the 
literature review. 
(iii) Scaling method 
For measuring the degree of red tape, an eight-point rating scale is adopted. The 
rationale for using such scale has been discussed before. 
There are five statements describing the existence of red-tape in an organization 
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which is based on the measurement techniques identified in the literature review. The 
respondents have to give a rating for their degree of agreement. If the respondent 
gives a high score, that means there is a high degree of red-tape in the project 
organization. For each questionnaire, the score for each statement for public and 
private organization will be sum up, so that a total score for red-tape in private and 
public organization can be produced respectively. 
 
4.3.5 Methods of analysis 
 After obtaining the relevant data from the respondents, several statistical tests are 
conducted. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 11.5 version is 
employed to carry out the following statistical tests: 
1. Paired-Samples T-test 
2. Correlational analysis 
3. One Way Analysis of Variance 
 
Paired Sample T-test 
In order to test for the both hypotheses, paired sample T-test was employed to 
test whether mean score for bureaucracy or red tape in Housing Authority project 
organization is greater than that in private residential project organization 
According to George and Mallery (2002), the Paired-Samples T-Test procedure 
compares the means of two variables for a single group. It computes the differences 
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between values of the two variables for each case and tests whether the average 
differs from 0.  
 When using t-tests to determine if two distributions differ significantly from each 
other, the test that measures the probability associated with the difference between the 
groups may be either a one-tailed or a two-tailed test of significance. The two-tailed 
test examines whether the mean of one distribution differ significantly from the mean 
of the other distribution, regardless of the direction of the difference. The one-tailed 
test measures only whether the second distribution differs in a particular direction 
from the first.  
 In this research, the one-tailed test of significance is employed to indicate 
whether the degree of bureaucracy or red tape in Housing Authority Projects is greater 
than that in Private Residential Projects. 
Correlational Analysis 
According to George and Mallery (2002), correlational analysis is conducted to 
find out whether there are statistical significant relationships: 
1. between each bureaucratic feature; and 
2. between each bureaucratic features and overall degree of red tape.  
The above two major analysis are done for both Housing Authority and Private 
residential projects.  
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Correlation is used to quantify the relationship between variables. Two variables 
are said to be correlated when there is some predictability about the relationship 
between them (Clark-Carter, 1997). Positive correlation means that one variable get 
bigger while the other gets bigger and negative correlation means that one variable 
gets smaller while the other gets bigger. 
 Correlation coefficient is also known as Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation 
Coefficient, which can be found by the following equation: 
  = Covariance between two variables 
     SD1 x SD2 
where SD1 and SD2 are standard deviations of the two variables. 
 The range of correlation coefficient is -1 to 1 (inclusive). A positive correlation 
coefficient indicates positive relationship and vice versa. For correlation coefficient 
equals to 0, there is no relationship between the two variables. In this research, mean 
scores are computed on each bureaucratic feature. Correlational analysis is carried out 
based on these mean scores for the factors. The researcher would like to find out any 
significant relationship among the bureaucratic features and the relationship between 
these features and the overall degree of red tape. 
 
One-Way Analysis of Variance 
 According to George and Mallery (2002), one way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) is conducted to find out any significant differences in respondents’ 
perception on an issue. In this research, two sets of ANOVA are conducted to compare 
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the degree of bureaucracy and red tape among their years of experience: 
1. 1-5 
2. 6-10 
3. 11-15 
4. 16-20 
5. 21 or above  
and their titles: 
1. Consultants  
2. Construction managers 
respectively. Altogether, two major comparisons are carried out in both Housing 
Authority Projects and private residential projects. 
 George and Mallery (2002) explained that analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a 
statistical technique developed by the English Statistician Sir Ronal Fisher in the 
1920s. One way ANOVA means that there is only one independent variable and one 
dependent variable. In this research, the score for the degree of bureaucracy in 
Housing Authority Project and Private Residential Projects are used as the dependent 
variable, while the difference ranges of experience and the organizational types are 
used as the factor for comparison. 
 There are 3 major assumptions in one-way ANOVA (SPSS Inc., 1999). 
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1. The k populations are normally distributed. 
2. The variances of the k populations are equal 
3. The observations are independent. 
One-way ANOVA is used to determine whether the difference among several sample 
means are greater than would expected by chance alone if the null hypotheses were 
true. The null hypotheses are (H0): 
H0: µ1 = µ2……µN 
(µ1 to µN is the group means of each group) 
where N is the number of groups. 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that the mean scores for all the organization types are  
the same. The test statistic for ANOVA is the F-ratio: 
 
F-ratio =  MSb 
      MSw 
 
 MSb reflects the variability among group means and is not affected by the 
variability of the observations within group. MSw is the weighted average of the 
variances of the observations about the group mean in each of the J groups. It is not 
affected by the differences among the group means. The F-ratio has an expected value 
of one. When H0 is false, MSB is expected to exceed MSw, and the F-ratio is expected 
to be greater than one. 
 After the computation of the F-ratio, the probability (p) of achieving the 
computed F-ratio, at the specified level of significance, should found. In this research, 
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a level of significance of 0.05 is used. We can conclude that H0 is false if p α and if ≦
p>α, H0 is tenable. 
 After conducting the ANOVA, it can tell that whether there are significant 
differences among the groups.  
 
4.4 Case study 
 In the part 2 of the research, an objective study approach is adopted to 
cross-validate the test result of hypothesis 1: Housing Authority project organization 
has a higher degree of bureaucracy than private project organization. There is a need 
for carrying out such objective cross-validation, it is because the subjective method 
can easily be affected by the variable of individual perception. Therefore, in order to 
test the validity of the subjective result, a quantitative method should be adopted to 
measure the degree of bureaucracy in private and Housing Authority project 
organization.  
 Furthermore, the researcher would like to map the roles of each project 
participants delineated by the rules or procedures. This can help to reveal how the 
rules and procedures delineate the contribution of each party into the project. In the 
following, the researcher would like to review the definition of roles first, then, the 
literature about the case study methods, case study design and method of analysis 
would be reviewed. 
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4.4.1 Role in project organization 
According to Hughes and Murdoch (2001), the relationship between a participant 
and an operation is known as a role. There is a variety of such roles, and they may be 
combined for each participant. They will be determined primarily by the purpose of 
each contribution as well as the participant’s skill and ability. 
The degree of detail and the classification of roles are dependent on the depth of 
the analysis and the purpose of the investigation (Cleland and King 1975). In their 
study, three types of system have been introduced, the Operating System, the Control 
System and the Managing System. These systems are exercised through various 
combinations of roles, and these are summarized in table 6 and grouped in Figure 2 
Table 6:  Definition of roles 
Role Definition 
Operating system 
Operating Carrying out work on some aspect of the project, and 
having overall responsibility for its output 
Co-operating Carrying out work as part of a team or committee with 
partial responsibility for output. 
Advising The provision of technical or other information when 
asked for it. Typically undertaken in the construction 
industry by professional consultants. 
Receiving Receipt of information about the project for purposes 
outside the management of the project: for example the 
accounts department of a client organization. 
Control system 
Monitoring Recording and filtering information about an operation and 
communicating it to those who may take action. 
Supervising Comparing progress with a predetermined plan and 
bringing about some sort of response to the situation. 
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Resourcing Ensuring that those who carry out operations have 
sufficient resources 
 
Managing systems 
Co-ordinating Ensuring that information flows successfully between 
organizational links and assembling diverse outputs 
Directing The executive responsibility for ensuring that the output of 
activities is orientated towards the objectives of the project
Recommending Passing information or the results of an activity to 
someone who must take a decision on it. 
Approving The executive function of taking decisions about the 
output of activities. This decision will usually form the 
input of a subsequent activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchy of roles related to systems 
Recommendations may arise at any level in the hierarchy, and will be subject to 
approval by the next level in authority. This Approval may become a recommendation 
to someone in a higher managing function again, so the chain of recommendation and 
approval passes up the management hierarchy until it reaches the person who ahs the 
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ultimate authority for the particular decision being taken. The ultimate authority in the 
project management system is the project manager or director or even the chief 
executive of the organization. Any analysis of a construction project’s organization 
ought to be capable of exposing the situation where integration is achieved through 
meetings and team-works. Thus the role of “Co-operating” is defined as membership 
of a team or committee. This can occur at any level in the system, and has to be 
shown separately because in such a case, even though there may not be an individual 
whose responsibility is to co-ordinate, it may take place by teamwork and meetings. 
These role definitions help to define the contribution that each participant makes 
to a project, and they relate to different type of system. Each level of decision-making 
constitutes a different level of detail for analysis. The control system should be 
applied at all levels. At operational level, control is achieved through the exercise of 
three roles. The process of observing is achieved via the role of monitoring. This 
gathering of information must include a certain amount of filtering, to make it 
effective. Thus, the Monitor undertakes some comparison of information to 
objectives.  
In the cases study, the researcher would like to map out the roles of the parties 
delineated by each prescribed rules and procedures. According to Cleland and King 
(1975)’s study, the roles of the parties can generally be classified as managing system, 
 
Chapter Four Methodology 
 
87 
control system and operating system. A comparison of the different pattern of roles 
delineated in public and private project organizations is made. 
4.4.2 Review of Case Study methods: 
In this research, an in-depth investigation is carried out to measure the degree of 
bureaucracy within the project organizations.  
According to Bryman (1989), case study has the following purposes: 
1. To achieve insights into a previously uncharted area. 
2. To test theories. 
3. To allow findings from other studies to be confirmed. 
As a result, in this research, case study method will be employed to 
cross-validate the result from the questionnaire. In the following, literature about the 
case study method will be reviewed first: 
 According to Brewerton and Millward (2001), case study involves the 
description of an ongoing event in relation to a particular outcome of interest over a 
fixed time in the “here-and-now”. Advantages of this design are: 
1. It enable a more in-depth examination of a particular situation than other designs; 
2. The information it yields can be rich and enlightening and may provide new 
leads or raise questions that otherwise might never have been asked; 
3. The people involved usually comprise a fairly well-circumscribed and captive 
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group, making it possible for the researcher to describe events in detail. 
Hilliard (1993) 1  suggests a number of different forms of case-study research, 
including narrative case-study research, single-case experiments, single-case 
quantitative analysis and combined quantitative/qualitative studies. The following is a 
review on these methods: 
Narrative case studies 
Narrative case studies employ qualitative techniques to elicit and analyse 
descriptive accounts. These narratives are concerned with making sense of the 
“stories” people tell about aspects of their experience. There are a number of different 
ways of gathering stories (e.g. stimulated recall of critical events, interviews, diaries 
or journal, open-ended questionnaires, observation of meetings) 
Single-case experiments 
These are known as “n=1” or single-subject studies and involve the systematic 
evaluation of change in individual cases. The aim is to record and assess specific 
changes attributable to specific interventions and usually involves systematic 
assessment before, during and after the intervention has occurred. 
Single-case quantitative studies 
In this type of design, the aim is to use quantitative techniques to trace the 
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unfolding over time of variables but without introducing any experimental 
manipulation or control over these variables as in the single-case experiment.  
Combined quantitative/qualitative case studies 
 To some extent, all quantitative case studies apply a version of this approach. It 
may, in some cases, be meaningless to report quantitative changes without reference 
to more in-depth material. However, in this case, in-depth data are used to back up or 
illustrate the quantitative findings. In case-study research, the notion of combining 
qualitative and quantitative data offers the promise of getting closer to the “whole” of 
a case in a way that a single method study could not achieve. The idea is based on the 
principle of triangulation which advocates the use of as many different sources of 
information on the topic as possible (e.g. questionnaire, observations, interviews) with 
a view to obtaining convergence on an issue. 
4.4.3 Case study design 
 In this research, narrative case studies method will be adopted. The documents 
prescribing the rules, procedures and organizational structure of the projects are 
collected from Housing Authority and private developers for the study. 
Measurement of bureaucracy 
The measurement of bureaucracy will be based on the five bureaucratic features 
identified by the previous research (Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman (1995); Bozeman 
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and Rainey (1998); York and Henley (1986) ). 
The methods for measuring these bureaucratic features are described below: 
1. Layers of hierarchy 
Count the number of hierarchies in the project organization. 
2. Degree of specialization 
Count the number of personnel involved in an activity. 
3. Number of administrative records kept 
Count the number of administrative records kept in performing an activity. 
4. Amount of written rules or procedures 
Count the number of written rules in performing an activity. 
5. Number of approval 
Count the number of approvals needed to perform an activity 
Mapping of roles delineated by rules and procedures 
For each rule and procedure, the roles of the parties delineated are classified into 
managing system, control system and operating system. The number of the rules and 
procedures classified under these three types of system is counted.  
4.4.4 Method of analysis 
In this research, the “Master Process Manual” from Housing Authority and the 
“Procedural Guideline for tendering process” from Hong Kong Land Properties Ltd 
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were collected for the analysis.   
The “Master Process Manual” from Housing Authority is a document which 
delineates all rules and procedures which have to be followed by each project team 
participants. The manual has detail description of rules and procedures in all project 
stages, including: feasibility studies, layout design, detail design, tendering and 
construction. 
On the other hand, the procedural guideline from Hong Kong Land Properties 
Ltd is an internal document which delineates all rules and procedures that the project 
team participants have to comply with during the tender stage in every project. Not 
same as the manual from Housing Authority project, this document only describes the 
rules and procedures in the tender stage. 
The method of analysis is first to measure the amount of the above five features 
quantitatively and then compare them for each type of organization. If the 
organization possess a higher amount of the above five features, then the degree of 
bureaucracy in that organization is said to be higher. 
For the comparison of different pattern of roles in the two types of project 
organizations, the number of each type of system implied in the rules and procedures 
would be counted and a comparison of the numbers is made between the public and 
private project organizations. 
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In this research, the researcher would like to compare the tendering section of the 
master process manual from Housing Authority with the tendering procedural 
guideline from Hong Kong Land Properties Ltd.  
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Chapter Five  Results and Discussions 
5.1 Introduction 
 After conducting the questionnaire survey and case study, empirical results are 
produced and analysed. In this chapter, the response rate and the basic information of 
the respondents are to be reported first. Afterwards, the results of questionnaire survey 
and data analysis are demonstrated. Finally, the case study result of Housing Authority 
and private residential project organization are to be reported and analysed. 
 
5.2 Response rate and basic information 
 
5.2.1 Response rate 
For the questionnaire survey, the researcher has identified 61 building 
contractors from the Housing Authority approved contractors list. Among them, 8 
building contractors agreed to participate in this research. 143 copies of 
questionnaires were emailed to the construction managers working in these 
contractors. 57 responses were received. The response rate is 39.86 percent.  
For the consultants, we have identified 180 design consultant firms from the 
company list provided by the Hong Kong Institute of Architects. 70 firms were 
randomly selected to contact. Among them, 10 firms agreed to participate in the 
research. 70 questionnaires are emailed to the respondents and 23 responses were 
received. The response rate is 32.86%. 
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Table 7: Response rate of questionnaire survey 
The response rate is considered as satisfactory, which exceed the expected 
response rate of 30%. The researcher believes that the telephone calls before sending 
the questionnaires which identify the contact person to assist distribution of 
questionnaires are effective in improving the response rate. However, the number of 
questionnaires sent is small when compare with the whole population of construction 
managers and consultants in Hong Kong. It is due to the fact that the identification of 
respondents as well as consent to sent questionnaires were ensured prior to any 
sending of the questionnaires. 
5.2.2 Number of valid questionnaires for study 
 In the section of methodology, the researcher has noted that, in order to avoid the 
problem of semantic difference on the meaning of red-tape, it is necessary to 
disregard those respondents who consider red tape as a positive attributes to the 
organization. Among the collected questionnaires, 5 responses from the group of 
construction managers and 3 responses from the group of consultants regarded red 
tape as a positive attribute to the organization, so these responses are considered as 
invalid and are disregarded. For the group of construction managers, the portion of 
valid questionnaires for study is 91.22 percent. For the group of consultants, the 
Parties No. of Questionnaires sent No. of Questionnaires received Response rate 
Construction managers 143 57 39.86 
Consultants 70 23 32.86 
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Age of the respondents
(Group of construction managers)
41-50
38%
31-40
45%
21-30
0%
51 or above
17%
21-30
31-40
41-50
51 or above
Age of the respondents
(Group of Consultants)
21-30
35%
31-40
45%
41-50
20%
51 or above
0% 21-30
31-40
41-50
51 or above
portion of valid questionnaires for study is 90.63 percent. 
5.2.3 Basic information of the respondents 
 
Age of the respondents 
 For the group of construction manager, 45% of them are aged between 31-40 
years old, 38% of them are aged 41-50 years old and 17 % of them are 51 years old or 
above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
For the group of consultants, 35% of them are aged between 21-30 years old, 
45% of them are aged between 31-40 years old and 20% of them are aged between 
41-50 years old.  
Figure 4 
Figure 3 
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Years of experience of the respondents
(Group of construction managers)
1-5
0% 6-10
27%
11-15
48%
16-20
19%
21 or above
6%
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21 or above
 This shown that, in this sample, the age of the respondents from the consultant 
group is generally lower than that of from the construction manager group. 
 
Years of experience 
 In the group of construction managers, 27% of them have 6-10 years of 
experience, 48% of them have 11-15 years of experience, 19% of them have 16-20 
years of experience and 6% of them have more than 21 years of experience. The 
proportions of each group of years of experiences are shown in the following 
bar-chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the consultant group, 40% of them have 1-5 years of experience, 25% of 
them have 6-10 years of experience, 25% of them have 11-15 years of experience and 
10% of them have 16-20 years of experience. 
 
Figure 5 
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Years of experience of the respondents
 (Group of consultants)
1-5
40%
6-10
25%
11-15
25%
16 -20
10%
20 or above
0%
1-5
6-10
11-15
16 -20
20 or above
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The result shown that, in this research, the respondents from consultants group 
are generally less experienced than the respondents from the construction managers 
group. 
Figure 6 
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5.3 Result of questionnaire survey and data analysis 
5.3.1 Measured degree of bureaucracy 
 The degree of bureaucracy is measured for both Housing Authority and private 
residential projects’ organizations. The respondents are asked to rate the degree of five 
bureaucratic features in the two types of project organizations. For each respondent, 
the scores for five bureaucratic features were summed up to produce a score for the 
overall degree of bureaucracy in Housing Authority and private residential project’s 
organizations respectively. In the following histograms, the distributions of scores for 
each bureaucratic feature are demonstrated: 
Hierarchies 
 
 
 
 
 
Rules and Procedures 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
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Figure 10 
Figure 11 
Figure 9 
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The mean scores of the five bureaucratic features in Housing Authority  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mean scores of the five bureaucratic features in private project organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the above histograms, we can see that in both Housing Authority and 
private project organizations, the bureaucratic feature of “rule and procedures” has the 
Figure 12 
Figure 13 
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highest score among all other features. This suggests that in both types of organization, 
“rules and procedures” can be regarded as the dominant bureaucratic feature. 
Besides, the score for the bureaucratic features in Housing Authority project 
organization are generally higher than that in private project organizations. This 
implies that the degree of bureaucracy in Housing Authority project is higher than that 
of private project. In fact, statistical test result for the comparing the degree of 
bureaucracy in Housing Authority and private residential project organizations would 
be discussed in later section. 
5.3.2 Measured degree of red tape 
 The degree of red tape is measured in both Housing Authority and private project 
organizations. There are altogether five questions to measure the degree of red tape in 
both types of organization (For the question, please refer to appendix II). The 
respondents were asked to give rating to each question for each type of organization. 
For each respondent, the scores of the questions were summed up to produce the 
overall scores for the degree of red tape in Housing Authority and private project 
organizations respectively. In the following histograms, the distributions of scores for 
each question are demonstrated: 
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Figure 16 
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Question 5 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Result of T-test 
Comparison of the degree of bureaucratic features in Housing Authority projects 
and private residential projects 
The paired-sample t-test is carried out to identify the magnitude and direction of 
the differences among the degrees of the five bureaucratic features and the overall 
degree of bureaucracy in Housing Authority and private project organizations. The 
results of the tests are shown in the following: 
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
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1. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the degree of Hierarchies in 
Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 8) 
Paired Samples Test 
  
2. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the degree of rules and 
procedures in Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 9) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
3. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the degree of approvals in 
Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 10) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Hierarchies (HA 
projects) - Hierarchies 
(Private projects) 
1.4306 1.54579 .18217 1.0673 1.7938 7.853 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Degree of rules and 
procedures (Housing 
Authority Projects) - 
Degree of rules and 
procedures (Private 
Projects) 
2.5833 1.40171 .16519 1.2539 1.9127 9.585 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Approvals (Housing 
Authority projects) – 
Approvals (Private 
projects 
1.1528 1.37031 .16149 .8308 1.4748 7.138 71 .000 
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4. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the degree of record keepings in 
Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 11) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
5. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the degree of specialization in 
Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 12) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
6. The result of T-Test for comparing the means of the overall degree of bureaucracy 
in Housing Authority projects and private residential projects (Table 13) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
From the above results, we can see that the degrees of all the five bureaucratic 
features in Housing Authority project organization are significantly higher than that in 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Record keeping 
(Housing Authority 
Projects) – Record 
keeping (Private 
Projects) 
1.1806 1.35653 .15987 .8618 1.4993 7.385 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Specialization 
(Housing Authority 
Projects) – 
Specialization (Private 
Projects) 
1.3889 1.31680 .15519 1.0795 1.6983 8.950 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Degree of bureaucracy 
in HA projects - 
Degree of bureaucracy 
in Private projects 
6.6667 4.77670 .56294 5.5442 7.7891 11.843 71 .000 
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the private project organization. Also, the Housing Authority project organization has 
a higher degree of overall bureaucracy. The empirical result shows that the hypothesis 
of “Housing Authority project organization has a higher degree of bureaucracy than 
that in private residential project organization” is not rejected. This result conforms to 
the findings in the literature review that public organizations are generally more 
bureaucratic than private organizations. 
Comparison of the degree of red tape in Housing Authority projects and private 
residential projects 
The paired-sample t-test was also conducted to see whether there is significant 
difference between the degree of red tape in Housing Authority and private residential 
projects organization. In the following, the difference of the mean score for Housing 
Authority and private residential project in each question is analysed first: 
 
1. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of Question 1 to measure red 
tape (Table 14) 
“Please compare the amount of rules and regulations which serve no practical purpose in  
public and private housing project organization”  
Paired Samples Test 
 
 
 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Question 1 (HA 
projects) – Question 1 
(Private projects) 
1.3472 1.31256 .15469 1.0388 1.6557 8.709 71 .000 
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2. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of Question 2 to measure red 
tape (Table 15) 
 “There are many rules and procedures have to be cut”  
Paired Samples Test 
 
3. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of Question 4 to measure red 
tape (Table 16) 
 “The client has much little discretion in enforcing the rules and procedures”  
Paired Samples Test 
 
4. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of Question 4 to measure red 
tape (Table 17) 
 “The client takes it very serious for non-compliance of the rules and procedures”  
Paired Samples Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Question 2 (HA 
projects) – Question 2 
(Private projects) 
1.1806 1.30359 .15363 .8742 1.4869 7.689 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Question 3 (HA 
projects) – Question 3 
(Private projects) 
1.2917 1.26087 .14859 .9954 1.5880 8.693 71 .000 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Question 4 (HA 
projects) – Question 4 
(Private projects) 
-1.1111 1.81198 .21354 -1.5369 -.6853 -5.203 71 .000 
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5. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of Question 5 to measure red 
tape (Table 18) 
 “The client is more concerned on following the rules and procedures rather than doing an 
effective job”  
Paired Samples Test 
 From the above results, we can see that among the five questions measuring the 
degree of red tape, four of them are rated significantly higher for the Housing 
Authority project organization, while only question 4 is rated significantly higher for 
private residential projects. This suggests that, in the private project organization, the 
client takes it more serious for the non-compliance of rules and procedures. This may 
be due to the fact that the private organizations are usually profit-making bodies, all 
policies and rules made are mainly for maximizing the efficiency and profit, so they 
require their staff or project team members to strictly comply with the prescribed rules 
and policies, otherwise, the objective of maximizing profit may not be achieved. As 
the result, the private clients are relatively strict in enforcing the rules and procedures 
during the project process. 
 
 
 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Question 5 (HA 
projects) – Question 5 
(Private projects) 
1.0694 1.40749 .16587 .7387 1.4002 6.447 71 .000 
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6. The result of T-Test for comparing the mean score of the overall degree of red tape 
(Table 19) 
Paired Samples Test 
  
The empirical result suggests that the degree of red tape in Housing Authority 
project organization is significantly higher than that of private project organization. 
The empirical result justifies the hypothesis that “the degree of red tape in Housing 
Authority project organization is higher than that of private residential project 
organization.” is not rejected. 
 
5.3.4 Results of bivariate correlational Analysis 
 Bivariate correlational analysis is employed to analyze the relationship among 
each bureaucratic feature and the relationship between each feature with the overall 
degree of red tape. The results are shown in the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Housing Authority 
projects – Private 
projects 
3.8333 3.24146 .38201 3.0716 4.5950 10.035 71 .000 
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The relationship among the bureaucratic features 
 The following correlation matrixes show the relationships among the 
bureaucratic features in both Housing Authority and private project organization. 
Table 20:  The result of correlational analysis among the bureaucratic features in Housing Authority project 
    Hierarchies Rules Approvals Record keeping Specialization 
Pearson Correlation 1 .364(**) .431(**) .410(**) .399(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .002 .000 .000 .001 
Hierarchies 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .364(**) 1 .334(**) .036 .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 . .004 .77 .76 
Rules 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .431(**) .334(**) 1 .052 .0501 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .004 . .68 .69 
Approvals 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .410(**) .036 .052 1 .515(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .77 .68 . .000 
Record keeping 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .399(**) .034 .0501 .515(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .76 .069 .000 . 
Specialization 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 21:  The result of correlational analysis among the bureaucratic features in private project organization  
    Hierarchies Rules Approval Record keeping Specialization 
Pearson Correlation 1 .539(**) .443(**) .296(*) .347(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .012 .003 
Hierarchies 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .539(**) 1 .532(**) .0345 .0546 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .77 .67 
Rules 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .443(**) .532(**) 1 .029  .041 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .85 .71 
Approval 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .296(*) .0345 .029 1 .279(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .77 .85 . .018 
Record keeping 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation .347(**) .0546 .041 .279(*) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .67 .71 .018 . 
Specialization 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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From the bivariate correlational analysis, several significant relationships are 
identified as follow: 
Positive relationship between “hierarchies” and other bureaucratic features 
This empirical result suggests that the feature of hierarchies is positively 
correlated with all other bureaucratic features. The increased degree of hierarchies 
would lead to the increase of the degree of other bureaucratic features. This 
phenomenon can be explained by the following proposition.  
If the number of hierarchies in the organizational structure is increased, that 
means the organization have become more complex, therefore more rules and 
procedures have to be enacted, so as to delineate the roles and responsibilities of each 
party. The increasing layers of hierarchies would inevitably increase the number of 
approvals for performing a task, because the number of authorities has been increased. 
In the meantime, more records have to be kept in order to secure trace back the 
responsibilities of each party. Also, the increased number of hierarchies means that 
the function of each party will become more specialized in order to achieve the 
efficiency of the organization. 
Positive relationship between “approvals” and “rules and procedures” 
 The increased number of approvals would lead to an increase of the number of 
rules and procedures, it is because the increased number of approval is usually 
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resulted from the increased number of authorities, as the result, more rules and 
procedures would be enacted to govern the operations and delineate their roles, 
responsibilities and the limits of authority. 
Positive relationship between “specialization” and “record keepings” 
 The increase of the degree of specialization means that each task would be 
further divided. As a result, the organization has to employ more personnel to perform 
more divided tasks. In order to ensure the accountability of each party, records have to 
be kept in order to provide a way to trace back the responsibility when there is any 
problem happened. Therefore, if the degree of specialization increases, the number of 
employees in the organization would increase, so more records have to be kept. 
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The relationship between the bureaucratic features and red tape 
The following correlation matrixes show the result of correlational analysis 
among the five bureaucratic features and red tape in both Housing Authority and 
private residential project organization: 
 
Table 22:  The result of correlational analysis between the bureaucratic features and the degree 
 of red tape in Housing Authority project organization 
 
Variables  Degree of red tape 
Hierarchies Pearson Correlation -.196 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .098 
  N 72 
Rules and procedures Pearson Correlation .876(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
  N 72 
Approvals Pearson Correlation -.077 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .520 
  N 72 
Record keeping Pearson Correlation .084 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .481 
  N 72 
Specialization Pearson Correlation .118 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .324 
  N 72 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 23: The result of correlational analysis between the bureaucratic features and the degree  
of red tape in private project organization 
 Variables   Degree of red tape 
Hierarchies Pearson Correlation .053 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .658 
  N 72 
Rules and procedures Pearson Correlation .744(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
  N 72 
Approvals Pearson Correlation -.030 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .803 
  N 72 
Record keeping Pearson Correlation -.214 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .071 
  N 72 
Specialization Pearson Correlation -.036 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .766 
  N 72 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 From the correlational matrixes, we can see that among the five bureaucratic 
features, only “Rules and procedures” is significantly correlated with the red-tape in 
both types of organizations. This empirical result has shown that if the amount of 
rules and procedures is large, the chance to have more red tape will be higher. The 
strong relationship between red tape and “rules and procedures” further supports 
Bozeman (1993)’s proposition that the emergence of red-tape is originated from rules 
and procedures. 
5.3.5 One Way Analysis of Variance 
In the following, on way analysis of variance is carried out to compare the 
degrees of bureaucracy and red tape perceived by the respondents with: 
1. different years of experience 
2. different titles 
in both types of organization. 
Comparison of the degrees of bureaucracy perceived by respondents with 
different years of experience 
i) Housing Authority projects organization  
Table 24: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of bureaucracy among different 
years of experience in Housing Authority project organization 
 
 
 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 317.118 3 105.706 7.276 .000 
Within Groups 944.360 68 14.529     
Total 1261.478 71       
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Means Plots of  
degrees of bureaucracy  
among different  
years of experience 
in Housing Authority project 
organizations 
(Figure 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
ii) Private residential project organization  
Table 25: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of bureaucracy among different 
years of experience in private project organization 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 131.826 3 43.942 6.194 .001 
Within Groups 461.131 68 7.094     
Total 592.957 71       
 
 
Means Plots of  
degrees of bureaucracy  
among different  
years of experience in 
private project organization 
(Figure 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
The empirical results above suggest that the respondent’s perceptions on the 
degree of bureaucracy vary with their years of experience. The respondents with more 
experience in the industry can perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in the project 
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organization. This may be due to the reason that the more experienced respondents 
can have a better understanding on the operation and structure of project organization, 
so that they can have a deeper understanding on what is bureaucracy, therefore, they 
can perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in the project organization. 
 
Comparison of the degrees of bureaucracy in the two types of project 
organization among the groups of consultants and construction managers 
i) Housing Authority projects organization 
Table 26: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of bureaucracy among the groups 
of consultants and construction managers in Housing Authority project 
organization 
   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 398.125 1 398.125 23.927 .000 
Within Groups 1164.750 70 16.639     
Total 1562.875 71       
 
 
Means Plots of the 
degrees of bureaucracy  
among the groups of 
consultants and 
construction managers in 
Housing Authority project 
organization 
(Figure 21) 
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ii) Private residential project organization 
Table 27: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of bureaucracy among the groups 
of consultants and construction managers in private project organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Means Plots of the  
degrees of bureaucracy  
among the groups of  
consultants and  
construction  
managers in private project 
organization 
(Figure 22) 
 
 
 
The empirical result shows that the consultants, in general, can perceive a higher 
degree of bureaucracy than construction managers. This can be explained by the 
reason that, the consultants are generally have a closer contact with the clients, thus, 
they are more familiar with the client’s organizational structure. As a result, they can 
perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in the organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 28.156 1 28.156 1.444 .234 
Within Groups 1364.719 70 19.496     
Total 1392.875 71       
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Comparison of the degrees of red tape perceived by respondents with different 
years of experience 
i) Housing Authority projects organization 
Table 28: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of red tape among different years of 
experience in Housing Authority project organization 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 439.083 3 146.361 11.350 .000 
Within Groups 876.903 68 12.896     
Total 1315.986 71       
 
Means Plots of  
degrees of red tape  
among different  
years of experience in 
Housing Authority 
project organization 
(Figure 23) 
 
 
 
 
iii) Private residential projects organization 
Table 29: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of red tape among different years of 
experience in private project organization 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 224.346 3 74.782 10.702 .000 
Within Groups 475.154 68 6.988     
Total 699.500 71       
 
Means Plots of the 
degrees of red tape  
among different  
years of experience in  
private project  
organization 
(Figure 24) 
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Comparison of the degrees of red tape perceived by groups of consultants and 
construction managers. 
i) Housing Authority projects organization 
Table 30: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of red tape among groups of 
consultants and construction managers in Housing Authority project 
organization 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 926.223 1 926.223 194.248 .000 
Within Groups 333.777 70 4.768   
Total 1260.000 71    
 
 
 
Means Plots of  
degrees of red tape  
among the groups of consultants 
and construction managers in  
Housing Authority  
project organization 
(Figure 25) 
 
 
ii) Private residential projects organization 
Table 31: The results of ANOVA comparing degree of red tape among groups of 
consultants and construction managers in private project organization 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 372.308 1 372.308 97.356 .000 
Within Groups 267.692 70 3.824     
Total 640.000 71       
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Type of respondents
consultantsconstruction manager
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Means Plots of  
degrees of red tape  
among the groups of 
consultants and construction 
managers 
in private project organization 
(Figure 26) 
 
 
 
 
The results above show an opposite phenomenon to the degree of bureaucracy. 
The respondents with more experiences and closer linkage to the client’s organization 
would perceive a lesser degree of red tape. This may be due to their better 
understanding about the project organization’s operation and structure, therefore, they 
can realize the actual functions of the rules and procedures, and therefore, they will 
not regard some “apparently non-functioning rules and procedures” as “red tape” so 
easily. Some parties simply do not understand or familiar with their actual functions 
and purpose are more likely to regard these rules and procedures as “red tape”. As a 
result, the respondents who can well understand the rules and procedures are less 
likely to refer them as “red tape”.  
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5.4 Result of Case Study 
In this part, the researcher compares the degrees of bureaucracy between 
Housing Authority and private residential project organization by studying the project 
procedural documents collected from the two organizations. The case study is adopted 
as an objective approach to cross-validate the result from the questionnaire survey.  
The procedural documents collected from the Housing Authority and HongKong 
Land Properties are the “Master Process manual” and “Procedural Guide for Tender 
process” respectively. These documents delineated all rules and procedures that the 
parties have to comply with. In the “Master Process manual” from the Housing 
Authority, all the seven work stages from the feasibility study to construction stage 
are covered, while the “Project Procedural Guideline for Tender Process” from 
HongKong Land only covers the tender stage. Therefore, the comparison will be 
made with regard to the tender stage only. That means, the researcher would compare 
the “Project Procedural Guideline for Tender Process” from Hong Kong Land 
Properties with the tender section of “Master Process manual” from the Housing 
Authority.  
For measuring the degree of bureaucracy in the two organizations, the researcher 
has counted the number of rules, procedures, approvals and record keepings 
delineated in the project procedural documents. For the feature of hierarchies, its 
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degree is measured by counting the number of hierarchies in the organizational chart 
of both project organizations. 
Furthermore, the researcher has mapped the roles of the parties delineated by 
each rule or procedure. For the three types of role, their frequencies delineated by the 
two sets of rules and procedure has been counted and compared. 
 In the following, the measured degree of bureaucratic features and the mapping 
of role of each party are demonstrated. 
5.4.1 The structures of Housing Authority and Hong Kong Land’s residential 
projects organization.  
Figure 27 
Figure 28
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5.4.2 Project procedural documents from Housing Authority and  
  HongKong Land Ltd. 
Figure 29 
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Figure 30 
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5.4.3 Comparison of the rules and procedures in the project organization of 
Housing Authority and HongKong Land Ltd. during tender stage  
Figure 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work Stage Procedures Sub-procedures Sub-sub procedures (HA) Sub-sub procedures(HKL)
5 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.1.1  (Approval) 5.1.1.1
5.1.1.2 (Record keeping) 5.1.1.2
5.1.2 5.1.2.1 5.1.2.1
5.1.2.2 (Approval x2) 5.1.2.2
5.1.2.3 5.1.2.3
5.1.2.4 (Approval) 5.1.2.4 (Approval)
5.1.2.5 (Approval) 5.1.2.5
5.1.2.6 5.1.2.6
5.1.2.7
5.1.2.8
5.1.3 5.1.3.1 5.1.3.1
5.1.3.2 5.1.3.2 (Approval)
5.2 5.2.1 5.2.1.1 (Record + Approval) 5.2.1.1
5.2.1.2 (Record) 5.2.1.2
5.2.1.3 5.2.1.3 (Approval)
5.2.1.4 5.2.1.4
5.2.1.5 5.2.1.5
5.2.2 5.2.2.1 5.2.2.1 (Approval)
5.2.2.2
5.2.2.3
5.2.2.4 (Approval)
5.2.2.5
5.2.2.6
5.2.2.7
5.2.2.8
5.2.3 5.2.3.1 5.2.3.1
5.2.3.2 5.2.3.2
5.2.3.3 (Record keeping) 5.2.3.3
5.2.3.4
5.2.3.5
5.2.3.6
5.2.3.7
5.2.4 5.2.4.1 5.2.4.1 (Approval)
5.2.4.2 5.2.4.2
5.2.4.3 5.2.4.3
5.2.4.4 5.2.4.4
5.2.4.5
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Work Stage Procedures Sub-procedures Sub-sub procedures (HA) Sub-sub procedures(HKL)
5.3 5.3.1 5.3.1.1 5.3.1.1
5.3.1.2
5.3.2 5.3.2.1 5.3.2.1
5.3.3 5.3.3.1 5.3.3.1
5.3.3.2 5.3.3.2
5.3.3.3
5.3.3.4
5.3.4 5.3.4.1
5.3.5 5.3.5.1 5.3.5.1
5.3.5.2 5.3.5.2
5.3.5.3 5.3.5.3
5.3.5.4 5.3.5.4
5.3.6 5.3.6.1 5.3.6.1
5.3.6.2
5.3.6.3
5.3.6.4
5.3.7 5.3.7.1 5.3.7.1
5.3.7.2 (Approval) 5.3.7.2 (Approval)
5.3.8 5.3.8.1 (Approval) 5.3.8.1 (Approval)
5.4 5.4.1 5.4.1.1 5.4.1.1
5.4.1.2 5.4.1.2
5.4.1.3 (Record)
5.4.2 5.4.2.1 5.4.2.1
5.4.2.2 (Record keeping) 5.4.2.2 (Record keeping)
5.4.2.3
5.4.3 5.4.3.1 5.4.3.1
5.4.3.2
5.4.3.3 (Record keeping)
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5.4 Comparison of the bureaucratic features in Housing Authority and Hong 
Kong Land’s project organization  
Table 32 
Bureaucratic features Housing Authority Hong Kong Land 
Hierarchies 8 5 
Rules and procedures 65 40 
Approvals 9 7 
Records keeping 7 1 
Specialization 123 58 
 From the above comparison, we can see that the degree of each bureaucratic 
feature identified from the Housing Authority project organization is higher than that 
in the private residential project. This can validate the result from the questionnaire 
and show that the hypothesis that “public project organization has a higher degree of 
bureaucracy than in private project organization” is not rejected. 
5.5 Comparison of the number of rules and procedures delineating the three 
types of roles  
Table 33 
Roles  Housing Authority HongKong Land’s Properties 
Managing System 12 12 
Control System 8 2 
Operating System 50 29 
By comparing the frequencies of the three types of roles delineated in two sets of 
documents, it is found that the Housing Authority has set up more rules and procedure 
to delineate both control and operating systems. This shown that the Housing 
Authority has a greater demand on the effectiveness of control and operating systems 
in the organization, it can be inferred that the existence of red tape is due to the 
Housing Authority’s too much emphasize on the control and operating systems. 
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Chapter Six  Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of analysis 
6.1.1 Comparison of the degrees of bureaucracy in public and private 
organizations 
 From the analysis of the results of questionnaire and case study, it is found that 
the Housing Authority project organization has a higher degree of all five bureaucratic 
features and overall bureaucracy than the private project organization. This conforms 
to the previous literature findings and justifies the hypothesis 1 “Public project 
organizations are more bureaucratic than private project organization” is not rejected. 
This provides a further support to the long debated argument of “organizations in 
public sector are generally more bureaucratic than that in the private sector” 
 In this research, bivariate correlational analysis and one way analysis of 
covariance(ANOVA) were carried out to interpret the results. The findings include the 
followings: 
(1) The more experienced respondents generally perceive a higher degree of 
bureaucracy in the project organizations: 
The researcher divided the respondents into several groups with different years 
of experience and compared their rated degree of bureaucracy with each other, it 
was found that the respondents with more experience in the construction industry 
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can relatively perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in the project organization 
than those who have less experience. This can be explained by the reason that the 
respondents with more experience in both public and private projects are more 
familiar with the project organizational structure and its operations, therefore 
they can perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in an organization. 
(2) The group of consultants generally perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy in 
the project organizations 
It was found that the mean scores for the degree of bureaucracy assessed by the 
group of consultants are significantly higher than that assessed by the group of 
construction managers. Similar to the reason above, the consultants generally 
have a closer and more frequent contact with the clients, so that they can have a 
better understanding about the client’s organizational structure, as a result, they 
can perceive a higher degree of bureaucracy. 
(3) Positive relationship between the bureaucratic feature, “hierarchies” and other 
bureaucratic features: 
This result suggests that the feature of hierarchies is positively interrelated with 
all other bureaucratic features. The existence of hierarchies would lead to the 
existence of other bureaucratic features. If the number of hierarchies in the 
organizational structure is increased, that means the organization have become 
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more complex, therefore more rules and procedures have to be enacted, so as to 
delineate the roles and responsibilities of each party. The increasing layers of 
hierarchies would inevitably increase the number of approvals for performing a 
task, because the number of authorities has been increased. In the meantime, 
more records have to be kept in order to secure trace back the responsibilities of 
each party. Also, the increased number of hierarchies means that the function of 
each party will become more specialized in order to achieve the efficiency of the 
organization. 
(4) Positive relationship between approvals and rules 
The increased number of approvals would lead to an increase of the number of 
rules, it is because the increased number of approval is usually resulted from the 
increased number of authorities, as the result, more rules and procedures would 
be enacted to delineate their roles, responsibilities and the limits of authority. 
(5) Positive relationship between specialization and record keepings 
When the degree of specialization increases, more staff has to be employed to 
perform the highly sub-divided task. Also, there is a need to ensure the 
accountability of each party by keeping their working records so as to provide a 
way to trace back their responsibilities once there is any problem. Therefore, if 
the number of staff in an organization is increased, the number of record 
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keepings will also be increased. 
6.1.2 Comparison of the degrees of red tape in public and private 
organizations 
 With regard to the degree of red tape, it is found that the Housing Authority 
project organization has a higher degree of red tape than the private project 
organization. The empirical result justifies that the hypothesis 2 “Public project 
organizations have a higher degree of red tape than private project organizations” is 
not rejected.  
A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship 
between each bureaucratic feature and red tape. It was found that only “rules and 
procedures” is significantly correlated with the degree of red tape. This shows that if 
the amount of “Rules and procedures” in an organization is increased, then the chance 
to have more red tape would be higher. This phenomenon can be explained by 
Bozeman (2000)’s proposition that “Red tape is one of the bureaupatholgies”. 
According to Bozeman (2000), “Rules and procedures” is an essential element to 
govern the operation of an organization, however, if there are excessive rules and 
procedures which do not serve any functional purpose, they will become red tape. The 
existence of red tape means that the efficiency of an organization is affected as 
resources are wasted to comply with these rules and procedures. 
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Among the five questions measuring the degree of red tape, it was found that 
there is one question which was rated higher for the private project organization. The 
question was “Whether the client takes it very serious for the non-compliance for the 
rules and procedures”. The result shows that, in private organization, the compliance 
of rules and procedures is more important than in the public organization. It may be 
due to the reason that private organizations are usually profit-making bodies, all 
policies and rules made are mainly for maximizing the efficiency and profit, so the 
clients require all project participants and stakeholders to strictly comply with the 
prescribed rules and policies, otherwise, the objective of maximizing profit may be 
failed.  
ANOVA was conducted to compare the degree of red tape perceived by the 
respondents with different years of experience and titles, it is found that the result is 
different from the situation of bureaucracy, the more experienced respondents and the 
group of consultants generally perceive a lower degree of red tape in the project 
organizations. This can be explained by the reason that the respondents with more 
experience and the group of consultants can have a better understanding about the 
project organization and the rules and procedures, so they can have a better 
interpretation to distinguish what are “functioning rules and procedures” and what are 
red tape. Those people who cannot understand the organization and the rules and 
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procedures clearly can easily regard the functioning rules and procedures as red tape 
6.1.3 Result of case study 
From the results of case study, it is found that the degrees of the five bureaucratic 
features in Housing Authority project organization are all higher than that in the 
private project organization. This validated the result of the questionnaire survey 
which justifies that the hypothesis of “public project organizations are more 
bureaucratic than private project organizations” is not rejected. On the other hand, the 
researcher has mapped and analysed the roles of the parties delineated by each rule 
and procedure. It was found that, when compare with private project organization, the 
extra amount of rules and procedures found in the Housing Authority project 
organization are mainly used to delineate the roles of the parties in the context of 
control and operating systems. This result suggests that the Housing Authority has put 
too much emphasize on the control and operating system of the project organization 
which result in more rules and procedures. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
existence of red tape is mainly due to reason that the Housing Authority’s has put too 
much emphasize on the control and operating system. 
6.2 Discussion of the findings 
 It is concluded from both literature and empirical findings in this research, the 
public project organizations have a relatively higher degree of bureaucracy and red 
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tape than private project organization. As proposed by Boyne (2002), a certain degree 
of bureaucracy is necessary for public organizations to safeguard their operations and 
ensure their accountability. The public organizations are public funded and should be 
under control by the public, therefore, it is a must to make sure the government 
officials are accountable to the public. As a result, the public organizations have a 
higher degree of bureaucracy than private organization is a normal phenomenon and 
in fact, it is necessary for them to be more bureaucratic.  
Although the rigid and formal bureaucratized organizational structure is ill-suited 
to deal with the change of environment, Mullins (1996) noted that only those 
organizations subjected to a turbulent environment are needed to be flexible in order 
to adapt to the change of environment. As the government is subjected to a relatively 
stable environment, therefore the rigid bureaucratic feature would not affect too much 
on its adaptation to the environment.  
According to the contingency theory proposed by Lawrence & Lorsch (1970), an 
organization should be designed according to different specific circumstances. Within 
a turbulent environment, like Hong Kong which has a very speculative real estate 
market, the private project organizations are needed to be designed as more organic as 
proposed by Burns & Stalker (1961) in order to cope with the rapid change of 
environment. Therefore, the private project organizations generally have a lower 
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degree of bureaucracy. When comparing with private project organizations, the public 
project organizations are subjected to less dynamic environment, as their 
developments are not affected by the economic market, thus they can maintain their 
highly bureaucratized structure so as to achieve the maximum efficiency. Therefore, 
the degree of bureaucracy in public project organization should be higher. 
However, if the degree of bureaucracy is in excess, dysfunctions would be 
evolved. The dysfunctions are generally regarded as “bureaupathology” which have 
been discussed comprehensively in the literature review. As proposed by Thompson 
(1961), if the organization emphasizes too much on the bureaucracy, the personnel 
would become more cautious about their job and hence, personal insecurity will be 
resulted. The result of personal insecurity is the enactment of more rules and 
procedures in order to reduce their insecurity. From the standpoint of the organization, 
such behaviour is pathological and detrimental. Besides, Merton (1940) also noted 
that once the rules become an end of itself, inefficiency would be resulted.  
One of the most criticized bureaucratic pathologies is red tape. It has been 
discussed comprehensively in the literature review. As red tape is one of the 
organizational dysfunctions caused by bureaucracy, thus, when the organization has a 
high degree of bureaucracy, the chance for it to have red tape would be higher. This 
argument has been justified by the empirical finding which justifies that public project 
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organization has a higher degree of red tape than private project organization. Red 
tape is the rules and procedures which require people to comply with, while serving 
no functional purpose. The compliance of such rules and procedures requires the 
commitment of resources in terms of time, human and money. Therefore, the 
existence of red tape is absolutely wasting the resources. Now, the empirical finding 
reveals that the Housing Authority project organizations really has a higher degree of 
red tape, thus, there is definitely a need to remove it. It is very important for the 
government to have a better use of the available resources, especially for the time of 
suffering serious budget deficit. The relevant authorities should carefully review the 
existing system of rules and procedures governing the projects, so as to improve the 
efficiency.  
The analysis of the result suggests that the perceived degrees of bureaucracy and 
red-tape are varied among different years of experience and type of organization. This 
provides a very important indication to the future research that, when measuring the 
degrees of bureaucracy and red tape by asking the respondents to give rating, their 
experiences and organizations should be taken into consideration and these two 
variables should better be fixed as constant. 
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6.3 Limitations of the study 
 In fact, there are some limitations in this research and these limitations are worth 
to discuss. Firstly, although the results are quite significant and strongly support the 
two hypotheses, the type of project studied in this research is only the residential type. 
Therefore, the result can hardly be generalized to other types of projects. Secondly, 
due to the reason of not many parties are interested to participate in the research, the 
sample of this research is relatively small when compare to the whole population in 
the industry. Therefore, the representiveness of the results is affected. It is definitely a 
problem as the conclusion should not be derived from a small group of people. 
Thirdly, the correlation studies do not provide irrefutable evidence of causation. It 
only shows the relationship about these two concepts only. Also, any reverse causality 
cannot be derived. Further laboratory or longitudinal studies are needed to firmly 
establish casual direction. Efforts should be done to rule out the common method 
effect. Therefore, software such as LISREL should be used. It allows for an 
assessment of directionality in cross-sectional data; however other models may also 
explain the data equally as well. Longitudinal designs that can better test for causality 
are still needed. Finally, due to the time limit and not many private developers would 
like to disclose their internal documents and information for the study, there is only 
one case study which is considered not enough. 
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6.4 Recommendation for future research 
 Several aspects which are not emphasized in the present study are worth for 
further investigation.  
Firstly, in this research, the researcher has only focused on the comparing the 
different degree of bureaucracy and red tape in Housing Authority and private project 
organization. It is not enough to assert that public project organizations are more 
bureaucratic and have more red tape, as Housing Authority is only one of the public 
organizations. There are actually quite a number of other public organizations 
responsible for managing the public sector projects, for example, Architectural 
Services Department, Civil Engineering Department and Drainage Services 
Department. We cannot rule out the possibility that Housing Authority has an 
especially high degree of bureaucracy and red tape. Therefore, it is better to do 
comparison between other public organizations and the private section. On the other 
hand, it is also worth to compare the Housing Authority with other public 
organizations to see whether Housing Authority has an especially high degree of 
bureaucracy and red tape.  
 Secondly, if the public organizations are really more bureaucratic and possess 
higher degree of red tape, the reason behind should be further investigated. A 
commonly cited rationale for higher levels of red tape and bureaucracy in public 
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sector is that public organizations are subject to greater level of accountability than 
private firms and face greater operating constraints that are manifested in the form of 
rules and red tape. However, Bozeman and Scott (1996) pointed out that, though 
accountability is the widely alleged source of red tape, it is not frequently examined in 
research. Therefore, a further study in this area is needed. In this research, the reasons 
of the higher degree of bureaucracy and red tape in public organization are only 
covered in the literature review, it is worth to study the reason behind empirically, 
because the rationale behind can provide an insight for us to know why there are more 
bureaucracy and red tape and the necessity for their existence in public organizations. 
Qualitative research can be done to investigate the attitude of government officials on 
the high degree of bureaucracy and red tape. 
 Thirdly, important normative issues in red tape are not addressed here, we have 
noted that red tape is not necessarily “bad”, if it affords protection for employees or 
customers or clients, if it provides greater accountability, or if it simply is a reflection 
of greater care. The methods and data we employ here do not permit us insight into 
whether the red tape in our sample organizations is “good” or “bad”. Future research 
should examine carefully the motives and consequences of red tape. Finally, the 
impacts of excess bureaucracy and red tape should be studied. If there are no 
empirical studies to illustrate the negative impact of bureaucracy and red tape on the 
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project, it can by no reasons convince the authority to have a review on its system. 
Actually, the negative impacts of bureaucracy and red tape are available in many 
previous literatures, however, it is worth to study whether these theoretical 
propositions can be observed in this industry and whether there are any other 
shortcomings which are not identified.  
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Appendix III 
Housing Authority Tender Procedural Guide 
Rules and Procedures in tender stage 
5 Tender Stage 
5.1 Prepare tender documents 
5.1.1 Preparation of Tender Drawing 
5.1.1.1 If some works cannot be detailed or drawings cannot be completed 
for billing, UContract TeamU decides on the drawing issue program to 
be specified in the contract and seeks agreement from respective 
UAssistant DirectorU and the UContract ManagerU. (MS: Directing,  
approving) 
5.1.1.2 UContract TeamU prepares copy negative of all as-measured drawings, 
if any, and keeps these unchanged for contract and record 
purposes (record keeping) (OS: Operating) 
5.1.2 Preparation of other tender documents 
5.1.2.1 UContract Coordinator U completes Project Design information sheet, 
advises in selection and compilation of appropriate standard BQs 
and agrees with UQuantity SurveyorU on items within standard BQs 
which are to be measured separately or as variations to the 
standard block. (OS: operating, advising, co-operating) 
5.1.2.2 UContract Coordinator U finalizes with UContract TeamU the nature and 
value of any Prime Cost Sums and/or Provisional Sums to be 
included in the contract, and identifies the attendance associated 
with these items, for inclusion in the Project Specification. 
Agreement is to be sought from UContract ManagerU (MS: 
Approving).Where Provisional Items and Provisional Sums are 
required to be included in the tender, UContract ManagerU should 
seek the endorsement of UAssistant DirectorU on the extent/scope and 
amount to be inserted prior to tender. (MS: Approving) 
5.1.2.3 UProject Quantity Surveyor U provides UContract ManagerU with updated 
estimate of contract for completing contract particulars. (OS: 
operating) 
5.1.2.4 UContract Coordinator U forwards information for compilation of 
contract particulars and calculation of liquidated damages to USenior 
Quantity SurveyorU for approval (MS: Approving)and passes the 
completed contract particulars and assessed liquidated damages to 
UProject Quantity Surveyor U for incorporation in the tender documents. 
(OS: operating) 
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5.1.2.5 UContract TeamU prepares List of Elements of Works of Safety 
concern. UContract Coordinator U obtains UContract ManagerU’s 
endorsement to the List (MS: Approving). UContract TeamU prepares 
tender document with reference to guideline for preparation of 
Project Specific Specification for Elements of Works of Safety 
Concern (OS: operating) 
5.1.2.6 UContract TeamU takes action and follows the procedures in 
accordance with the implementation of the Pay for Safety Scheme. 
(OS: operating) 
5.1.2.7 UContract TeamU prepares List of Elements requiring Warranties to be 
included in the Contract. (OS: operating) 
5.1.2.8 UContract TeamU checks that the provision has been made to allow 
for the testing of materials and workmanship. (MS: monitoring) 
 
5.1.3 UCompletion of Tender Arrangement 
5.1.3.1 UContract ManagerU provides the following information to the UProject 
OfficersU (OS: operating) responsible for the management of the 
entrustment works: 
(a) The intended date for calling for tenders 
(b) The current estimated cost of the works in that PWP item 
(c) The cost of the administration fee 
(d) Anticipated spread of expenditure by financial years 
(e) The nature and approximate value of the Housing Authority 
work to be included in the contract; and 
(f) Where appropriate, the area to be occupied by the contractor 
and the anticipated programme for completion of various 
sections of the work with particular reference to any problems 
of access that are likely to arise. 
5.1.3.2 Contract Manager confirms with the Project Officer (outside CD) 
responsible for management of the entrustment works that is 
financially and administratively in order to tender and arrange for 
the issue of the Allocation Warrant. (OS: operating) 
 
5.2 Invitation of tender 
5.2.1 Before Tender-out date 
5.2.1.1 On request from Senior Geotechnical Engineer/Technical Secretary, 
Contract Manager provides information of contracts to be tendered 
6 months before tender-out. (OS: operating) 
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5.2.1.2 After receiving replies of interested contractors from Senior 
Geotechnical Engineer/Technical Secretary, Contract Coordinator 
complies and maintains the tenderer list for Contract Manager. 
Contract Manager issue letter of invitation to tenderers of the 
contract, two weeks before the tender-out date, with copies to 
Senior Geotechnical Engineer/Technical Secretary and Senior 
Manager. (Record keeping) (OS: operating, CS: Monitoring) 
5.2.1.3 For contracts where tenderers are not shortlisted in accordance 
with the established rules, Contract Coordinator arranges 
prequalification of tenderers in accordance with the relevant 
Financial Instruction. (OS: operating) 
5.2.1.4 In case the tender-out date is deferred to the next quarter or later, 
Contract Coordinator informs Senior Geotechnical 
Engineer/Technical Secretary to include the contract in the next 
3-months tender schedule for an updated list of eligible tenderers. 
(OS: operating) 
5.2.1.5 Contract Coordinator forwards tender program to Senior Manager 
not less than 2 weeks before tender-out date for monitoring the 
workload of contractors and imposing/uplifting tender restriction as 
appropriate. (OS: operating) 
 
5.2.2 Tender Notification & Invitation 
5.2.2.1 Contract Coordinator provides return to Senior Geotechnical 
Engineer/Technical Secretary for arrangement of publishing the 
Tender Notification in the government gazette and local press 6 
months before tender-out date. (OS: operating) 
5.2.2.2 Contract Coordinator checks and modifies the Notes to Tenderer to 
suit and pass to Project Quantity Surveyor. (OS: operating,  
CS: monitoring) 
5.2.2.3 40 days or more after gazetting the Tender Notification and about 3 
weeks before tender-out date, Contract Manager issues letter of 
tender invitation to the eligible tenderers of the contract by fax and 
registered post. (OS: operating) 
5.2.2.4 The duration between tender-out and tender-in should be 42 days 
unless approval from respective Assistant Director (MS: approving) 
has been obtained to reduce the period the period to 28 days as a 
special case. 
5.2.2.5 If the tender invitation is less than 40 days after gazetting the 
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Tender Notification or no gazetting of tender notification has 
previously been made, Contract Coordinator has to arrange with the 
Comm. Secy. to publish the Invitation to Tender in the government 
gazette and (OS: co-operating) the local press 42 days before 
tender-in unless approval from respective Assistant Director has 
been obtained to reduce the period to 28 days as a special case.  
5.2.2.6 Contract Coordinator review availability of site and informs Contract 
Manager any deferral to tender program. (OS: operating) 
5.2.2.7 Contract Coordinator arranges for inspection of tender drawings by 
tenderers (OS: operating) 
5.2.2.8 Project Quantity Surveyor delivers to Senior Survey Officer/Clerical 
Officer one working day before tender-out sufficient tender 
documents for distribution. (OS: operating) 
 
5.2.3 Action during Tender Period 
5.2.3.1 Contract Coordinator advises Contract Manager of any reason for 
deferral of the date of tender return for Contract Manager’s decision 
(OS: advising) 
5.2.3.2 Contract Manager obtains agreement from Assistant Director via 
Project Manager as appropriate to extend the tender period and 
issues letter to all tenderers (MS: approving) with copy to Senior 
Manager and Senior Geotechnical Engineer. (records keeping) 
5.2.3.3 After tender-out, Contract Coordinator sends the tender document 
to Senior Quantity Surveyor/Chief Architect (records keeping) (MS: 
monitoring) 
5.2.3.4 Senior Survey Officer informs Contract Coordinator and Project 
Quantity Surveyor of any contractors who have not collected the 
tender documents 5 working days after the tender-out date. 
Contract Coordinator contacts these contractors to see if they still 
wish to tender. (OS: operating) 
5.2.3.5 Contract Manager arranges and holds tender briefing for all 
tenderers to clarify particular aspects of the contract. (OS: 
operating) 
5.2.3.6 Project Quantity Surveyor prices the tender documents and 
produces a tender estimate one week before tender-in date. (OS: 
operating) 
5.2.3.7 Senior Survey Officer informs Contract Coordinator, Project 
Quantity Surveyor and Senior Manager any invited tenderers who 
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have not collected tender document by the tender-in date. (OS: 
operating) 
5.2.4 Tender Addenda (if any) 
5.2.4.1 Contract Coordinator collates all tender addenda information and 
seeks agreement from Contract Manager before passing the 
information to Project Quantity Surveyor for issuing to all tenderers. 
(MS: approving) 
5.2.4.2 Tender addenda that may require a significant change to the 
tenderer’s pricing considerations should not be issued within 2 
weeks before the tender-in date. (OS: operating) 
5.2.4.3 Project Quantity Surveyor issues the addenda through Senior 
Survey Officer and consultant Project Quantity Surveyor issues the 
document directly to tenderers (OS: operating) 
5.2.4.4 Project Quantity Surveyor ensures all tenderers have collected 
tender addenda before the tender-in date (CS: monitoring) 
5.2.4.5 Project Quantity Surveyor informs Contract Coordinator any 
tenderers who have not collected the tender addenda before 
tender-in date. (OS: operating) 
 
5.3 Evaluation of tender 
5.3.1 Tender Evaluation System 
5.3.1.1 The consideration of tender award for all building contracts is based 
on the Preferential Tender Award System (PTAS). Invalid tenders 
are to be excluded in the calculation of the PTAS to ensure that the 
comparison amongst valid tenders will not be distorted. 
5.3.1.2 In recommending acceptance of a tender, Contract Manager also 
takes into consideration tenderers’ updated performance in the past 
12 months. The number of adverse reports under Housing Authority 
contracts is to be set out in the Tender Paper for reference. (OS: 
operating) 
5.3.2 Re-tendering 
5.3.2.1 CM may consider recommending to TC for re-tendering under one 
of the following circumstances: (OS: Advising) 
(a) a policy change; 
(b) unrealistic tender prices 
(c) a major change of scope of contract works 
(d) a major change in Public Housing Development Programme 
(e) nil or insufficient number of tenders returned. 
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(f) any other special circumstances as recommended by the CM. 
 
 
5.3.3 Distribution of Tenders for Examination 
5.3.3.1 Comm. Secy forwards financial information submitted by tenderers 
to Finance Senior Director for examination. (OS: advising) 
5.3.3.2 Contract Coordinator, upon collection of tender submissions from 
Comm. Secy., forwards all tenders to Project Quantity Surveyor. 
(OS: operating) 
5.3.3.3 Project Quantity Surveyor forwards relevant sections of the three 
tenders with the highest Preferential Tender Scores to Contract 
Team for preparation of information for Tender Paper. (OS: 
operating) 
5.3.3.4 Project Quantity Surveyor examines the three tenders with the 
highest Preferential Tender Scores. (OS: operating) 
 
5.3.4 Notification to Tenderers 
5.3.4.1 Contract Coordinator notifies the three tenderers with highest 
Preferential Tender Score and the remaining tenderers. 
(OS: operating) 
 
5.3.5 Evaluation of Submitted Tenders 
5.3.5.1 Contract Coordinator interviews tenderers for technical and 
contractual clarifications if necessary (OS: operating) 
5.3.5.2 Senior Quantity Surveyor provides Contract Manager and Project 
Quantity Surveyor one week before the Tender Committee Meeting 
with comparison of construction cost with other recent tenders of 
similar type of buildings. (CS: Monitoring) 
5.3.5.3 Senior Quantity Surveyor provides Comm. Secy. one week before 
the Tender Committee Meeting Schedule of Comparative 
Information of Tender Rates of Major items (OS: operating) 
5.3.5.4 Contract Manager notifies Project Building Services Engineer, the 
method of construction and any objection on the NSC tenderers 
from the three tenderers with the highest preferential tender scores. 
(OS: operating) 
5.3.6 Preparation of Tender Paper 
5.3.6.1 Contract Coordinator checks the program/progress of letting of all 
separate contracts and nominated sub-contracts. (CS: supervising) 
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5.3.6.2 Project Quantity Surveyor provides Contract Coordinator with draft 
tender report and cost schedules at the agreed date or five weeks 
before Tender Committee Meeting(OS: operating) 
5.3.6.3 Contract Team provides Contract Coordinator with report on any 
technical submissions. (OS: operating) 
5.3.6.4 Contract Manager forwards draft Tender Paper to Senior Financial 
Manager. (OS: operating) 
5.3.7 Recommendation of Acceptance of Tender 
5.3.7.1 Project Quantity Surveyor provides Contract Coordinator and 
Quantity Surveyor with final tender report and cost schedules two 
weeks before tender approval date. (CS: Monitoring) 
5.3.7.2 Contract Manager submits final Tender Paper and tender report to 
Comm. Secy. via Assistant Director and Deputy Director 
(Construction) to Housing Development Tender Board for clearance 
and to Tender committee for approval. (MS: Approving) 
5.3.8 Recommendation of Revision of Project Development budget 
5.3.8.1 Project Manager seeks Building Committee approval for revised 
Project Development Budget (PDB) prior to tender award.  
(MS: Approving) 
 
5.4 Tender acceptance 
5.4.1 Preparing Letter of acceptance 
5.4.1.1 After approval of revised by Project Development Budget by 
Building Committee, Contract Manager prepares the Letter of 
Acceptance based on the standard format  (OS: operating) 
5.4.1.2 Contract Manager passes the acceptance letter to Chief Quantity 
Surveyor to check the letter and the post tender correspondence 
attached to the letter is contractually in order. (CS: Monitoring) 
5.4.1.3 Contract Manager forwards a copy of the letter of acceptance to 
Senior Manager and Quantity Surveyor. (records keeping) (CS: 
Monitoring) 
5.4.2 Procedures for preparation of contract documents 
5.4.2.1 Project Quantity Surveyor arranges for the compilation and binding 
of all documents. (OS: operating) 
5.4.2.2 Project Quantity Surveyor prepares sufficient bound copies of 
Contract documents. (Record keeping) (OS: operating) 
5.4.2.3 Contract Coordinator arranges for the binding of all contract 
drawings into a separate contract document. Contract Coordinator 
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prepares one bound original set and one bound duplicate set of 
contract drawings and send to Senior Survey Officer/Clerical Officer 
for contract signing arrangement. (OS: operating) 
5.4.3 Contract Signing 
5.4.3.1 Quantity Surveyor arranges the contract signing ceremony with the 
Divisional Head and the contractor. (OS: co-operating) 
5.4.3.2 Senior Survey Officer/Clerical Officer forwards original copy of 
contract document to Senior Finance Manager and distributes all 
certified true copies of contract documents to Contract Team. (OS: 
co-operating) 
5.4.3.3 Senior Survey Officer/Clerical Officer forwards original contract 
drawings to the Comm.Secy. and forward duplicate set of contract 
drawings to the contractor. (record keeping) (OS: co-operating) 
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Hong Kong Land Tender Procedural Guide 
Rules and Procedures in tender stage 
5.1 Preparation of tender documents 
5.1.1 Preparation of Tender Drawings 
5.1.1.1 The consultant architect and Structural Engineer should prepare the 
design drawing. (OS: operating) 
5.1.1.2 If some work cannot be detailed or drawings cannot be completed for 
billing, Project Manager decides on the drawing issue programme to be 
specified in the contract 2 weeks before tender-in date. (MS: Directing) 
5.1.2 Preparation of other tender documents 
5.1.2.1 Consultant QS compiles BQs for tendering (OS: operating) 
5.1.2.2 PQS finalize with consultant QS the nature and value of any Prime Cost 
Sum and/or Provisional Sums to be included in the contract. (OS: 
Co-operating) 
5.1.2.3 Consultant QS provides PQS with updated estimate of contract for 
completing contract particulars. (OS: operating) 
5.1.2.4 PQS prepare and forward the contract particulars and calculation of 
liquidated damages to PM for approval. (MS: approving) 
5.1.2.5 PQS prepare the list of elements of works of safety concern according to 
the Hong Kong Land construction safety programme and include this into 
the contract document. (OS: operating) 
5.1.2.6 Consultant QS prepare list of elements requiring Warranties to be 
included in the Contract. (OS: operating) 
 
5.1.3 Completion of Tender Arrangement 
5.1.3.1 Project Manager decides the whole tender programme. (MS: Directing) 
5.1.3.2 Project Manager compiles a draft of tender document for approval by all 
project team members. (OS: Operating) 
 
5.2 Invite Tenders 
5.2.1 Before tender-out date 
5.2.1.1 The Project Manager shall prepare a list of suitable tenderers 3 weeks 
before the tender out date. (OS: operating) 
5.2.1.2 In the event that project consultants have been appointed, the Project 
Manager must receive written evaluations and recommendations from the 
consultants concerning suitable tenderers. (OS: Advising) The list of 
suitable tenderers may be based on expertise, responsibility, integrity, 
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workmanship standards, size, competence for the work contemplated, 
and any other appropriate factors.  
5.2.1.3 The proposed tenderers on the list should be asked to confirm in writing 
that they are interested in tendering prior to the finalization of the list. The 
final list shall include a minimum of 3 tenderers and must be approved in 
writing by the Executive Director, Projects. (MS: Approving) 
5.2.1.4 When preparing the list of suitable tenderers, in addition to the factors 
listed above, the following factors should be considered:  
- financial standing, both current and historical 
- Similar projects completed, particularly concerning size, scope 
and duration. 
- General experience and reputation. 
- Management structure as appropriate for the contract. 
- The tenderer’s capacity at the time of the contract 
5.2.1.5 The prospective tenderers should return these forms prior to any 
prequalification meeting. The Project Manager should then question the 
prospective tenderer with knowledge of the company and also expand on 
the project details during the meeting. (OS: Operating) 
 
5.2.2 Tender Notification & invitation  
5.2.2.1 The duration between tender-out and tender-in should be 21 days unless 
otherwise approved by Project Director. (MS: Approving)) 
 
5.2.3 Action during tender period  
5.2.3.1 Tenderer should show whether there is a need to defer the tender 
program and the Project Manager should make decision on the deferral. 
(MS: Approving) 
5.2.3.2 The Project Manager should issue letter of invitation to all tenderer to 
collect the tender. (OS: operating) 
5.2.3.3 If the tenderer does not collect the tender, the Project Manager should find 
another tenderer to fill up the original list based on the advice of 
consultant team. (OS: Operating, Advising) 
5.2.4 Tender Addenda (if any) 
5.2.4.1 PQS collates all tender addenda information and seeks agreement from 
Project Manager (MS: Approving) 
5.2.4.2 PQS issues the addenda to all tenderers (OS: Operating) 
5.2.4.3 PQS informs Project Manager any tenderers who have not collected the 
tender addenda before tender-in date. (OS: Advising) 
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5.2.4.4 PQS prices the tender documents and produce tender estimate. (OS: 
operating) 
 
5.3 Evaluation of Tenders 
5.3.1 Tender Evaluation System 
5.3.1.1 All tenders should be opened at the same time and as soon as possible 
after the deadline for submission and in the presence of the Executive 
Director, Projects, the Project Manager and the PQS. (OS: Operating, CS: 
Supervising) 
5.3.1.2 Any tender received after the deadline for submission may only be 
opened at the discretion of the Executive Director, Projects or the Project 
Manager, provided that it is opened at the same time as all other 
tenderers. (MS: Approving) 
5.3.1.3 Details of the submitted tender sums shall be recorded and 
signed/witnessed by all those present. (CS: supervising) 
5.3.1.4 The review of all tenderers should be performed in strict confidence. No 
information or details concerning any tender including pricing should be 
disclosed to any third party other than the architect or other project 
consultants used by HKL for the purpose of reviewing the tender. 
5.3.2 Re-tendering 
5.3.2.1 Project Manager may consider recommending for re-tendering under one 
of the following circumstances: (MS: recommending) 
(a) There is a large scope change 
(b) There is a large event which require the project to be stopped. 
 
5.3.3 Distribution of Tenders for Examination 
5.3.3.1 PQS forwards financial information submitted by tenderers to Financial 
department for examination. (OS: Receiving) 
5.3.3.2 PQS forwards the 3 lowest tenders to Consultant QS for examination 
(OS: Advising) 
 
5.3.4 Notification to Tenderer 
-  No prescribed rules and procedures 
 
5.3.5 Evaluation of Submitted Tenders 
5.3.5.1 Project Manager interviews tenderers for technical and contractual 
clarification. (OS: operating) 
5.3.5.2 The PQS will promptly carry out a detailed evaluation of the submitted 
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tenders and issue an initial tender report to the Project Manager, the 
consultant architect for advising on all relevant costings and contractual 
matters. (OS: operating, advising, MS: recommending) 
5.3.5.3 Separately, the appropriate consultants shall carry out initial technical 
evaluations of the tender submissions and issue an initial evaluation 
report to the Project Manager with suggested lists of clarification items for 
each tender. (OS: operating) 
5.3.5.4 The Project Manager shall immediately schedule tender review meetings 
with the lowest tenderers as determined appropriate. At these meetings, 
the list of clarification items shall be discussed and the tenderer will be 
required to provide a written response for each item to the Project 
Manager and appropriate project consultants. (OS: operating) 
 
5.3.6 Preparation of Tender Paper 
5.3.6.1 PQS should prepare the cost and contractual aspect of the tender paper 
and other consultants should prepare the technical and architectural 
aspect of the tender paper. (OS: Operating) 
 
5.3.7 Recommendation of Acceptance of Tender 
5.3.7.1 Once all clarification items have been resolved with respect to each of the 
lowest tenderers, or at the time the Project Manager decides appropriate, 
the PQS shall issue a final tender report on financial and contractual 
matters, and then the appropriate project consultants shall issue a final 
recommendation of acceptance report to the Project Manager.  
(OS: operating, advising) 
5.3.7.2 Project Manager should submit final tender paper to Executive Director, 
Project for approval. (MS: approving) 
 
 
5.3.8 Recommendation of Revision of Project Development Budget 
5.3.8.1 Project Manager should seek Chief Executive’s approval for revised 
Project Development budget prior to tender award. (MS: approving) 
 
5.4 Tender Acceptance 
5.4.1 Preparing Letter of Acceptance 
5.4.1.1 Upon receipt of the written approval form the Executive Director, Projects, 
or the appropriate HKL Senior Management, the consultant architect or 
Project Manager, as appropriate, shall issue a letter of acceptance to the 
 
Appendix III 
 
 
approved tenderer. (OS: operating) 
5.4.1.2 Once the letter of award has been issued by the appropriate HKL owning 
company and confirmed in writing by the tenderer, the unsuccessful 
tenderers should be promptly advised in writing that their tenderers were 
not accepted. (OS: operating) 
5.4.2 Procedures for preparation of contract booklet 
5.4.2.1 After issue of letter of acceptance, PQS arranges for the compilation and 
binding of all documents, except drawings, into a “Contract Booklet”.  
(OS: operating) 
5.4.2.2 PQS prepares sufficient bound copies of Contract Booklet including, 
original, one duplicate and requisite number of certified true copies. 
(record keeping) (OS: operating) 
5.4.3 Contract Signing 
5.4.3.1 The Marketing department arranges the contract signing ceremony.  
(OS: operating) 
 
Note: MS:  Managing system 
 OS: Operating system 
 CS: Control system 
 
 
